

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW AND CONSIDERATION OF INDIA AFFAIRS




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A

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW

AND

CONSIDERATION

OF

INDIA AFFAIRS;

PARTICULARLY OF THE

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

MHARATTA WAR,

FROM ITS

COMMENCEMENT

TO THE

MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1782.

LONDON:

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THE writer of the following sheets, in submitting them to the consideration of the public, feels himself more influenced by zeal for the community, than by any views of a private or personal nature. He is therefore little solicitous of literary rewards, or interested in the reputation he is likely to obtain as an author, farther than as such a wish may be connected with that strict regard to truth and justice, which is the chief object of his ambition, and the only qualification essentially requisite to constitute the character to which he aspires.

If the impartial relation of circumstances to which he has adhered should fortunately rescue one fact from the mist of falshood, with which the arts of designing and interested men have laboured to disguise it, or assist in doing justice to the conduct of one individual, who might otherwise fall a victim to the secret shafts of envy, and the malicious rancour of party, he will enjoy a conscious and heart-felt pleasure, superior to every other possible gratification, and consider such a recompense as fully proportioned to the assiduity and anxious trouble with which he has collected,

com-

Zamboni

compared and arranged the several materials of which the present narrative is composed.

His satisfaction will be perfect, and his reward complete, if by an early and candid exposition of the state of affairs in India, and of the several political transactions which have led thereto, he should be so happy as to furnish any information of the smallest public utility, and tending to point out the means of either remedying past evils, or preventing a repetition of similar disasters hereafter.

It is with this animating hope that he presumes to address the Honourable Court of Directors of the United East-India Company upon the present occasion, and to submit the following production to their particular attention and consideration, convinced that the watchful care and ardent zeal, with which they are accustomed to superintend and promote the important interests committed to their management and direction, will make them gladly and favourably listen to whatever bears an appearance of contributing to advance the same desirable object, and that at all events, their well-known candour and generosity of sentiment, will make every indulgent and liberal allowance, and pardon any defect in the performance itself, in consideration of the motives from which it originated,

A
RETROSPECTIVE VIEW
AND
CONSIDERATION
OF
INDIA AFFAIRS.

A FAITHFUL account of the Mharatta war, including every material transaction of a military as well as political nature, that has occurred in India for above eight years past, must at this juncture prove a pleasing and interesting subject, and be of infinite use to throw a just light upon those important points, which are at present the objects of public enquiry and discussion, and in obtaining a certain knowledge of which, national justice, no less than that due to many individuals of character and station in the Company's service, is so essentially concerned.

The magnitude and difficulty of the task, though it excites my apprehension, cannot deter me from the attempt; because, however defective my narrative may be found in the exterior ornaments of style and grace of composition, it will (I am conscious) be dictated by the warmest and most zealous wishes for the interests

of my country, by a mind totally divested of all prejudice or partiality whatever, and by an actual knowledge of most of the important facts that are related, which is derived either from personal observation, or from such authentic papers and vouchers, as are positive and incontrovertible.

✓ To the encouragement this consideration gives me, is added another motive still more animating, when I reflect that this narrative is expressly intended for the perusal of the Company's representatives at home, and upon a subject which they have deemed deserving of the most particular and careful attention, and will, on that account, no less than from their acknowledged candor and liberality, receive, with flattering satisfaction, every information regarding it, that bears evident marks of truth and moderation of temper.

I shall not take up more time in the dull formality of a preface, but after explaining in few words the nature and extent of the present work, enter immediately into a detail of circumstances, avoiding as much as possible any impertinent or unnecessary intrusion upon the patience of the public, as well as every attempt to bias or influence their judgments, either by offering opinions which are obvious and self evident, or by putting such interpretation and gloss upon facts, as might disguise their true colour, and best serve any particular and partial purpose.

It is to a clear and exact, though not circumstantial, relation of facts I mean to confine myself. I shall endeavour to shew the consequences of every military and political effort, and the advantages and disappointments respectively produced by them, without minutely describing the operations of the campaign, or the intrigues of the cabinet, farther than may be necessary

to point out the errors of the particular systems from which the latter may have originated, and to prove the misfortunes that have ultimately flowed from them.

A more extensive plan might encrease and embellish the subject, but would not answer any useful purpose of information, which is the sole end I have in view, and with the hope of which alone I am animated to enter upon the present task with zeal and cheerfulness.

The frequent occasion I shall have in the course of this narrative to mention the Mharattas, their great power as a nation, and indeed the circumstance of its being entirely owing to the system originally adopted by the Company's servants in India regarding them, that their affairs are at present so critically and alarmingly situated, renders some account of their government in this place highly proper and requisite.

The origin and foundation of their empire is a subject rather of curiosity and amusing speculation than of useful enquiry; it cannot therefore properly belong to this place: and were I even disposed to display my talents for historical investigation, and the industry with which I have exerted them, I should on this occasion decline such an attempt, and acknowledge it anticipated by a production which I have lately seen, published by an officer of the Bombay establishment, and containing the most reasonable, and (I believe) genuine account of the original formation and subsequent rise of the Mharatta power, which has yet been obtained by the European enquirer. I shall therefore only touch upon the subject, and in the most general terms.

The mode of government established by its first great founder, Sahou or Sewajie, proved to be of no long duration; for although the name of sovereignty still

remains with the Rajah, and each succeeding Peishwa receives the investiture of that office from his hands, according to the ceremonious forms originally practised; this mark of superiority and attention is almost the only one at present observed; and the real power of the state, together with the entire control and management of affairs, is exercised and conducted by, and under the express authority of, the Peishwa, who keeps his court at Poonah. This place is at present considered as the capital of the Mharatta empire, since the Rajah, who constantly resides at Settara, a strong and almost inaccessible fortress about sixty miles distant, is never permitted to stir out of the latter, but like the bird in its gilded cage, is dazzled and amused by the false glare of external ceremony and respect, which only serves to make the gloom and wretchedness of his prison more conspicuously splendid.

There is perhaps scarce any family in the history of mankind, which has produced an equal number of illustrious and able characters to that of the present reigning Peishwa. It was to the address and influence of its founder, Ballajee Pundit, that Rajah Sahou was indebted for the establishment as well as growth of his empire, and gratitude at first made him repose a confidence in his benefactor, which habits of indolence towards the latter part of his life, and the ability and talents of the other, improved into a total relaxation from the care and fatigue of business on his own part, and a delegation of his authority to the Peishwa. The successors of the latter treading in his footsteps, have transferred this authority to themselves as matter of right, and a precedent to establish the sovereign power at present exercised by them.

An administration formed and conducted by men of the character above mentioned, and which, to other engines of a despotic and uncontrollable will, unites that of religion, the most powerful of all, must necessarily act with decision and vigour, and by its wise and cautious policy, continue to preserve the wide-extended empire it has acquired, no less from the fatal consequences of domestic dissensions than from the efforts of foreign enemies.

The truth of this observation is proved by our own dear-bought experience, and the disappointment given to the hopes we have long cherished, and even yet unfortunately too much encourage, of creating a division of interest among the leaders, and in particular of separating Mahadjee Scindia from the minister Nana Furnese.

It is certain a combination of very extraordinary and unforeseen events had, at one period, opened to us a reasonable prospect of obtaining that influence at the court of Poonah which good policy had long since suggested to the Company at home, and induced them to recommend to their servants in India, as a constant and leading object, in order to exclude and defeat the intrigues of the French nation.

It is almost unnecessary to add, that the period to which I allude must have been that favourable crisis, when Ragonaut Row, brother to the Peishwa Ballajee Badjerow, after having acted as regent during the minorities of his two nephews, Madhurow and Narrain Row, and upon the demise of the latter, having enjoyed the dignity and exercised the functions of Peishwa himself, was compelled to fly from the machinations of that very party which now governs the Mharatta

ratta state, and to implore the protection and aid of the English to restore him to his native rights.

It is at that period I propose to commence my narrative, because it was then that our affairs became so intimately blended with Mharatta politics, as to form a leading object in all our future councils and measures, and it is to the line of conduct then adopted by the government of Bengal, that we may ascribe the present war with that nation, and of course the multiplied misfortunes and ruin with which, in its consequences, it has already overwhelmed the British interests in India.

Had the Governor General and Council, when they received a clear, and, as it afterwards appeared, unexaggerated account of the state of the war, (wisely, and in conformity to the wishes of the Company, entered into by the government of Bombay in support of Ragonaut Row) chose to avail themselves of the favourable opportunity, which their own unimpaired strength, and the comparative weakness of the acting administration at Poonah, so fortunately offered them; and instead of putting an immediate stop to hostilities, had they shewed the smallest determination of supporting the claims of the unhappy exile, there cannot remain a doubt in the breast of any unprejudiced person, who has read and considered attentively the public records of that period, but that Ragonaut Row, in conjunction with us, would have shortly been enabled to dictate terms of submission to his opponents, and that with the re-establishment of his authority, all our political objects and wishes in the Mharatta state would have been completed.

In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to mention the following undoubted fact, "that when the

"treaty

“ treaty with Ragoba was concluded by the Bombay
 “ government, and their troops had joined him in the
 “ field, the ministers were so exceedingly alarmed,
 “ that they sent a vakeel to Bombay to solicit peace,
 “ on terms the most advantageous both to Ragoba and
 “ the Company; but before they had delivered their
 “ commission, which they were prevented some days
 “ from doing, on account of the Governor’s being in-
 “ disposed, letters arrived from the Bengal government,
 “ disavowing the war, and professing a determination
 “ to make peace; in consequence of which, the vakeel
 “ changed his tone, haughtily demanding the restitu-
 “ tion of Salfette, and the other places of which we
 “ had taken possession, and the surrender of Ragonaut
 “ Row into their hands.”

It is farther worthy of observation, that at the time
 of our withdrawing the Bombay troops from Ragonaut
 Row’s support, his own force consisted of between
 thirty and forty thousand men, the greatest confidence
 and alacrity prevailed throughout the army, in conse-
 quence of the superiority recently obtained over the
 ministerial leader, Hurry Punt Forkea, and many of
 the principal chiefs of the opposition had given proofs
 of an inclination to espouse the interests of Ragonaut
 Row, which they would most assuredly have followed,
 if we had discovered any intention of prosecuting the
 advantages already obtained by our arms, and encour-
 aged them to take such a step, by affording a safe and
 certain asylum against the dangerous consequences that
 might otherwise attend it.

Instead of this, a line of conduct totally different,
 was unfortunately adopted, and the sentiments of a
 majority, equally remarkable for the rectitude and in-

tures, as for the impolitic and fatal tendency of many of the measures themselves, prevailed in Bengal against every argument of a just and wise policy, derived from the long experience and observation of the gentlemen who at that time constituted the minority, and who in the instance now alluded to, were certainly directed by a perfect knowledge of, and regard to, the interests of the Company and their country.

The consequence of these measures was such as might naturally have been expected. The Mharatta administration, taking advantage of the eager and anxious desire we discovered for peace, dictated one, upon conditions in every respect disproportioned to the success of our arms, and to the superior condition we were in at that time to prosecute the war.

Inadequate and imperfect as they were, we however acceded to them, and the impatience of the Bengal government to obtain a treaty, did not suffer them to discern, that the one concluded by Colonel Upton at Poorunda, March 1st, 1776, was of so ambiguous and indeterminate a nature, as to give entire security and satisfaction to neither party, and to put it in the power of both to renew the war, whenever it might suit either their interest or inclination.

The Mharattas in the mean time reaped the most solid benefits from this treaty. Sunk considerably as a state in that consequence, which before the famous battle of Panniput * they held among the states of Hindostan,

* In this remarkable battle, fought little more than twenty years ago, the principal Mahomedan chiefs in Hindostan, ranged under the banners of the conquering Abdallah Duranee, struggled for superiority with the Hindoo powers led on by the Mharattas,

Hindoostan, and which, under the short but vigorous administration of Madhurow, elder brother to Narrain Row, they were just beginning to recover, when his death, and the dissentions that ensued, joined to the successful interposition of our arms, plunged them once more into weakness and distress, they required a short peaceful recess, not only to deliver them from the dangers immediately impending, but to recruit their exhausted strength, and prepare for future contests.

Such a respite was peculiarly seasonable to the party which then directed the government, in opposition to the claims of Ragobaut Row, because it afforded the leaders of it an opportunity of exerting all their arts to blacken his character and effectually ruin his cause; and it is to the good use they made of this opportunity, that we may attribute the total disaffection which afterwards prevailed against Ragoba throughout the Decan, and rendered every future effort in his favour inadequate and unsuccessful; for by delay, always dangerous, and commonly fatal in domestic contests, the threats and promises of the minister, joined to the liberality he found it necessary to practise on many occasions, had leisure to operate in their full extent; and those men who entered into the original association

Mharattas, and, after a severe and bloody conflict, proved victorious. Soujah ul Dowla distinguished himself greatly on this occasion; and on the side of the Mharattas, besides many leaders of note, and above twenty-five thousand men, the famous Sujaba, brother to the reigning Peishwa, Ballajee Pundit, and his eldest son, Vissnaut Row, were unfortunately slain. This melancholy event made so deep an impression on the mind of the father, as to shorten his days, and for a considerable period before his dissolution, he was constantly repeating the name of his beloved son, and holding imaginary conversations with him.

against Ragoba, were not only confirmed in their own enmity, but conscious of the resentment and jealousy which must continue to animate him, should he experience any favourable change of fortune, they felt it impossible to place the smallest confidence in his professions of favour, and promises of forgiveness, and therefore considered their own destruction as the necessary consequence of his elevation to power.

The character of the man greatly encouraged such an idea, and the apprehension of his vindictive spirit was so great, that even those who were originally well-affected to his interests, and had never taken any active part against him, but who had peaceably acquiesced, or perhaps continued to hold appointments under the new administration, thought it dangerous to risque a change, which must expose them to the effects of his jealousy and suspicion, and became therefore interested in the support and success of his adversaries.

Thus the impolitic and unseasonable treaty, concluded with the Mharattas in March 1776, deprived us of the advantages which were then certainly within our grasp; and by the ruin it brought upon the cause of Ragonaut Row, rendered a future war an object of the greatest difficulty and hazard, and not to be undertaken but upon grounds of expedient and indispensable necessity.

To the misfortune of the Company, their ruling servants in India were not contented with representing merely the disappointment occasioned by this treaty, but they drew such a flattering picture of the unsettled and distracted state of the Mharatta government, and suggested in such lively colours the advantages which we might still be able to reap from their divisions, that, as the "*Delenda est Carthago*" of the wise Cato was formerly

formerly the favourite and popular maxim with the ambitious Romans, to pave their way to universal empire, in like manner, the settlement of the Mharatta state became a fixed and primary object with our leading politicians, both at home and abroad, in order to secure an unrivalled dominion in India.

From this circumstance it happened, that the Court of Directors, deceived by false and exaggerated representations, did not give that decisive and salutary check to the disposition of their presidencies in India, which alone could have prevented a renewal of hostilities:—on the contrary, they contented themselves with simply declaring their positive intention of strictly adhering to the terms of the treaty made by Colonel Upton, which they, however, acknowledge is not upon the whole so agreeable to them as they could wish, and feel themselves at the same time compelled, by motives of honour, humanity, and justice, to authorise a breach of it, by agreeing to the protection given to Ragoba, in direct contradiction to an express article (and no doubt, in the opinion of the Mharatta minister, the most interesting and important one) of the treaty.

It was, in fact, impossible for the Company to have adopted a different line. To have surrendered Ragonaut Row into the hands of his inveterate, his personal enemies, would have entailed an indelible stain upon the honour and good faith of the nation, and have been justly considered as a base and pusillanimous action, which no prospect of future advantage could in any respect warrant. To persist in affording him protection was an actual breach of treaty, and violation of the public faith solemnly pledged for its performance. The alternative appeared at first sight equal, and was certainly a hard one, which required the most judi-

cious deliberation, but when maturely weighed, the difficulty of choice soon vanished.

By the former we must have rendered ourselves infamous in the eyes of Hindostan and the world, whilst by the latter, we risked little more than offending the Mharattas, and incurring their just resentment and suspicion of our hostile intentions.

It is even more than a reasonable supposition, that by address and proper management, influenced by a sincere wish on our part to preserve the peace, we might have been able to satisfy the minister, and reconcile him to a measure, which it was surely our business to convince him originated solely from a regard to our character and dignity as a nation, and not from any views of a nature calculated to serve our own secret purposes hereafter, or to prejudice and destroy his authority in the state.

Instead of this, the whole of our conduct had evidently a quite opposite tendency. We insisted, with the most minute and studied exactness, upon the strict performance of points in themselves trifling and unimportant, but which, by making the subjects of discussion, we forced into political consequence, in order to irritate as much as possible the minds of the Mharattas. We disputed about the true meaning of a couple of Persian words, which, if interpreted to our wish, would have added to the Company's annual revenue, the enormous sum of about ten thousand pounds sterling more than the minister proposed to give, in conformity to the sense in which he understood them. We also peremptorily demanded the dismissal of a person belonging to the French nation from the court of Poonah, who, with whatever intentions deputed there, it is evident, and has been since fully proved,

did not enter into any formal engagements with the minister, although the latter would have been fully justified by our conduct relative to Ragoba, and the unfriendly disposition we so strikingly manifested, if he had even solicited the alliance and support of the French, as a security against our future hostile attempts.

On such immaterial and ill-founded points did we insist with the minister, and call his non-compliance a breach of treaty, forgetting how many more important and more just causes of complaint he had to exhibit against us, relative to Ragonaut Row, to the cessions made by Fuddy Sing of Chickley, Verriow, &c. &c. and even to the restitution of Salsette itself, which he had been absolutely taught to expect from the justice and generosity of the Bengal government.

The apprehension (I should have said, the knowledge) of an intended French alliance, has been politically assigned as the principal motive of entering into the war with the Mharattas. The grounds of such a belief were, however, altogether fallacious, and I make no scruple to assert, that the Mharattas never had a thought of any thing more, than maintaining a general good understanding with the French nation; that they neither wished nor attempted to break their alliance with us; and that the hostilities which immediately followed the facts of which I have been speaking, might not only have been prevented by our efforts, but were consequences originating entirely from our own active measures, absolutely calculated as well as intended to produce a war.

This assertion naturally excites curiosity to enquire, since the war on our part is evidently of choice, and
not

not of necessity, by whose management and counsel the nation became involved in a contest, which has proved the fruitful source of innumerable misfortunes, and has brought us to the very brink of a precipice, beyond which, if we advance a single step, certain and total ruin must ensue.

I have already mentioned the dissatisfaction with which the treaty of March 1776 was justly received both at home and abroad, by all those who knew the real situation of affairs at the time it was concluded, and were sensible of the advantages we sacrificed, without obtaining any adequate benefit or security, in return.

These therefore, it is probable, would readily approve of any system they supposed to be calculated to recover that superiority; and unfortunately the ruling servants in India either did not see themselves, or chose not to let their constituents see, that the golden opportunity was irrecoverably lost, and that those leaders in the Mharatta state, who once discovered an inclination to support the interests of Ragonaut Row, were, for the reasons I have already assigned, become totally averse from his cause.

From their partial and exaggerated accounts it unfortunately happened that a latitude of action was left them, of which they did not fail to avail themselves; and the ambition of a majority on one side of India co-operated with avarice on the other, to precipitate a rupture, which, if the wise counsels and able policy of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler could have prevailed, must have been fortunately avoided; nor would Hyder Ally have since dared to take advantage of a feeble and corrupt administration, to invade the dominions, and ruin the power of the English in the Carnatic.

It is plain, therefore, that the disposition and sentiments of the Bengal and Bombay presidencies perfectly corresponded and co-operated on that occasion; but as the latter uniformly consulted with, and acted by the express orders of the former; and as every part of their conduct was authorised in the most full and direct manner; as the power of prevention also remained with the Bengal government, and as they not only did not exert it, but took an active and zealous part to promote hostilities, it may surely be advanced, upon every ground of political reasoning and justice, that Mr. Hastings was the real and responsible author of the Mharatta war, and that it remains with him to answer to the Company and his country for the countless train of evils and misfortunes in which it has involved them.

I have thus conducted my narration to the actual breaking out of the war, which I conceive to have been in the early part of the year 1778, when the detachment from Bengal commenced its march (at least then so understood) to Bombay; for under whatever colour the real intent of this measure was disguised, or whatever specious arguments were made use of at the time to reconcile it to the Mharatta minister, and to overcome the solid objections brought against it by the minority, it is evident that Mr. Hastings foresaw, and was prepared for, the consequences; and that, though he affected to express "a reasonable expectation of the administration at Poonah being alarmed at so vigorous a measure, and made to act with more good faith towards their allies," nothing was farther from his idea, than to prevent hostilities, which, it plainly appeared from his subsequent conduct, he was fully bent upon, and determined should take place at all events.

The Mharattas themselves, well knowing the disposition of the Bombay, and, from recent circumstances, suspicious of that of the Bengal government, could not but behold this proposed accession of strength to the former at that particular juncture with the most jealous and anxious eye. They accordingly discouraged the measure all in their power, without absolutely refusing a passage through their country, and thereby offending the English, which they studiously endeavoured to avoid; and when, notwithstanding their declared disapprobation, the troops persisted in their march, the minister certainly considered such conduct as an undoubted proof of our unfriendly intentions, and equal to the most open and violent act of hostility.

It was not till the middle of May that the Bengal detachment, consisting of six battalions of seapoys, a company of native artillery, and about eight hundred horse, (in all near five thousand men) crossed the river Jumna at Kalpée, a short time previous to which a revolution had been effected at Poonah in favour of Moraba Furnese; and the government of Bombay, who, it should be observed, had neither assisted in bringing it about, nor exerted themselves vigorously in supporting it after it was accomplished, from a belief of this chief's attachment to Ragonaut Row, sent directions to the officer commanding the detachment, to halt where their letter might reach him, until he received their farther orders.

This new administration proved, however, of very short duration, and Nana Furnese, by the timely aid and enterprising address of Scindea,* soon recovered his

* Nana Furnese, while in the hands of Moraba, had artfully disguised his ambitious views under the mask of the most specious mode-

his superiority, and resumed the reins of government, which he has ever since continued to guide, while Moraba lingers out a wretched captivity at Ahmednagur, which has been lately made more close and rigorous by the discovery of a plot for his deliverance, to which it is said the governor of the fortress was privy, and has in consequence suffered death.

I cannot here avoid a short digression, to observe how firmly the power of the minister, Nana Furnese, seems to be at present established. Of all the chiefs heretofore leagued with himself and rivals in power, and of all those who have been at any time suspected by him, as favourers of the cause of Ragonaut Row, Moraba is the only person remaining to excite the most distant jealousy or apprehension. All the rest have either died in prison, or have purchased their liberty by the payment of a large sum of money, and contentedly submitted to poverty and a private condition.

Hurry Punt Furkea, the general of the state, is solely indebted to the minister for his present elevated rank and consequence. He lives with him on the most confidential footing, and in case of his ruin, must inevitably share the same fate, or sink into total obscurity.

moderation, and had carried his deep dissimulation so far, as to declare that he had no other wish, but to visit the holy city of Benares, for which purpose he actually assumed a habit of peculiar piety and devotion, while at the same time he was secretly carrying on a correspondence with Mahadjec Scindea, and settling with that chief the precise manner and particular hour for apprehending Moraba and rescuing himself. This service Scindea accordingly performed on the 28th of June, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, and secured the person of Moraba, whilst Nana laughed at the credulity of his rival, and deridingly told him, that he meant to defer his visit to Benares a little longer.

Scindea, to whom Nana Furnese may be said to owe every thing, has reaped and still enjoys every solid advantage, both with respect to fortune and ambition, which, as the most powerful subject of a great and well-established empire, (and to nothing more must he aspire) he can possibly desire or expect. No change of government will prove beneficial to him; and the degree of jealousy mutually subsisting betwixt himself and Hurry Punt, which Nana, it is probable, fees, and secretly encourages, to render each more immediately dependant upon himself, must at all events prove a sufficient check and obstacle to their forming any designs prejudicial to a person, whose continuance in power they know to be so strictly connected with their own safety and success.

Holkar only remains to be mentioned; and his personal character is an ample security against any mischief which his influence in the state, even if prompted by secret inclination, could possibly effect; for he has all along been directed by Scindea in his political conduct; nor is there any reason to suppose he will venture to embrace a different system.

From the above remarks, and from the farther consideration, that all the other Mharatta chiefs of any weight or consequence are Brahmins, and by their prejudices against Ragonaut Row, no less than by their interested connection with the minister, under whom they enjoy confidence and authority, are of course firmly devoted to his cause, it is assuredly a reasonable opinion, as far as human foresight can reach, to pronounce the present administration of Poonah established upon the firmest and most durable basis, and equally secure from domestic dissensions and internal treachery, as it is from the efforts of foreign enemies, whose dan-
gerous

gerous and enterprising attacks it has in a late striking instance, by an able, extensive, and well-concerted system of policy, found means effectually to defeat in the very moment of success.

The restoration of Nana Furnese's authority made it necessary for the Bombay government to revert once more to their hostile system. They accordingly sent orders for the advance of the Bengal troops, and relying upon their support, they proceeded to contrive the means of opposing and removing the acting administration at Poonah, which had been the original object of the formation of the detachment, and indeed of all the measures which they had been pursuing for a considerable time before, in concert with the Bengal presidency.

The resolution of the Select Committee of Bombay, for adopting a specific plan in favour of Ragoba, was taken the 21st of July, and communicated to the honourable Governor General and Council, whose approbation they received the 27th of September following. A formal treaty was then concluded with that chief, bearing date the 24th of November, 1778, and the Bombay forces immediately took the field, in order to conduct him to Poonah, and place him in the regency, according to the agreements mutually made for that purpose.

Thus far no part of the conduct of the Bombay government appears in any degree reprehensible. I do not, however, allude to the particular conditions settled with Ragonaut Row on this occasion. It was, perhaps, in one respect, fortunate, that the entire failure of the enterprise itself prevented them from ever becoming the subjects of serious consideration or discussion. I speak only, at present, to the general nature

ture of the plan, which, it must be acknowledged, was undertaken with the positive sanction, concurrence, and, I may say, knowledge of the Governor General and Council.

How strange, then, how inconsistent, and how contrary to every rule of policy, and even common sense, will the conduct of the latter be judged, when it is known, that they were at the same time secretly attempting a negociation with Modajee Bolla, the Rajah of Berar, the real object of which they studiously concealed from the knowledge of the Bombay government; and by a refinement in political intrigue heretofore unessayed, thought to attain a determinate end, by pursuing at one and the same time two distinct avenues of action, which pointed to objects diametrically opposite, and which it was absolutely impossible could ever unite, or be in the smallest degree reconciled to each other.

In order to explain this business fully, it is necessary to recur to the period almost immediately subsequent to the revolution at Poonah in favour of Nana Furdse, when by the vigilance and zeal of the gentlemen who composed the Secret Committee for managing the Company's affairs in Europe, certain intelligence of a French war was communicated with a secrecy and dispatch that can scarcely be credited.

This intelligence did Mr. Hastings make the basis of his proposal for a plan he had long meditated of an alliance with the Rajah of Berar, the grand object of which involved the success of a project the most wild and impracticable that ever entered the mind of a politician. It was in fact altogether chimerical, and in no shape to be reconciled to the known abilities and political discernment of him who cherished, and has since

since continued to indulge it, to such a height of extravagant and infatuated belief, as not to allow the evidence of positive facts which carried conviction to all the world besides, to diminish the confidence he placed in the friendly disposition of the Bcrar prince, or even totally destroy the hopes he still maintained of raising him to the sovereignty of the Mharatta empire.

The delusion at first imbibed has continued to operate to our prejudice during the whole of the war; and I cannot but consider the proposals for a treaty with the Mharatta administration, transmitted through the channel of Modajee Bofla, in October, 1780, and the late appointment of Mr. Chapman to the court of Naigpore, possessing at the same time authority to negotiate with the Mharatta state, as two measures equally weak, impolitic, and destructive of the true interests of the Company, as well as frustrating their ardent desire for peace. But the justice of this remark will be more fully proved in the detail of subsequent transactions. It is sufficient for the present purpose to observe, that even at the period of which I am now speaking, and previous to the full discovery which the government of Bengal might have made of Modajee's real intentions, from the correspondence of Mr. Watherston, who was deputed in December, 1778, to the court of Naigpore by General Goddard, and particularly from a letter addressed to them by the General himself, dated at Burhanpore, February 5, 1779, where, after mentioning the advices he had just received from the Rajah, of the total overthrow of the Bombay forces at Tellingong, the uncertain, contradictory, and at the same time alarming, nature of the dispatches arrived both from the Bombay Committee and their army in the field, and the determination he had formed in consequence,

sequence, of proceeding immediately towards Surat, he gives his opinion of Modajee's aversion to the future prosecution of the proposed project in the following clear and pointed words: "I am induced to believe, he (Modajee) would object to my continuing in his dominions, because, with the account he has written me of the transactions at Poonah, he has proposed my returning to Calcutta by such road as I shall find most convenient and eligible, without making any reference to your expected replies to his letters, or to their consequence in favour of his views, in concert with your government."

I say, exclusive of the lights derived from the above source, a cool and impartial consideration of the nature of the plan itself would have served to convince any unprejudiced person of its extravagance, and have suggested the impossibility of prevailing upon a wise and discerning court, like that of the then government of Naigpore, to hazard and endanger its future existence as a powerful state, in pursuit of a chimerical scheme of aggrandizement, which, upon every principle of political reasoning and judgment, was surrounded by such great and innumerable difficulties, as to be justly pronounced impracticable.

What excuse, then, can be brought for the Bengal government's wishing to adopt such a scheme, and not only seriously endeavouring to effect it, but doing so at a time when they had reason to believe the presidency of Bombay had actually entered upon the execution of another, under their express sanction and authority, and depended for its success upon the support of the Bengal detachment, supposed to be then on its march to their assistance?

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That this, however, was the case, it is only necessary to observe, that the approbation given by the Bengal government to their proposed plan in favour of Ragonaut Row was dated in August, 1778, and the instructions given to General Goddard, upon the grounds of those formerly furnished Mr. Elliott, in the November following. That in the preceding month of July, they had briefly communicated Mr. Elliott's mission to the Bombay Council, but had concealed the particular object of it, relative to an offensive alliance with Modajee, and his establishment in the Râuge of Settara. That it is true, they then used the precaution, in order, as they say, to prevent any steps of a contrary tendency on the part of the Bombay presidency, to request "that they would refrain from forming any engagements of a nature hostile to the administration at Poonah, excepting such as might appear absolutely necessary for the defence of their own possessions;" and that even this precaution, vague and inconclusive as it must appear, was intirely neglected in the letter of approbation above alluded to, which contained only a restriction "from entering into any engagements with Ragoba of a tendency hostile to the government of Berar, or contrary to such as Mr. Elliott might have apprized them of his having concluded with Modajee Bolla."

Thus, then, it plainly appears, that the government of Bombay, through the whole of the transactions which followed Colonel Upton's treaty in March, 1776, to the formation of the engagements made with Ragoba in November, 1778, were encouraged, supported, and fully authorized by the Governor General and Council, who nevertheless most unaccountably, I had almost said treacherously, deserted their plan at the

very moment it became ripe for execution, and secretly adopted a new and distinct project, the pursuit of which could not fail, in its consequences, effectually to defeat the success of the enterprise in favour of Ragoba; nor was it till the month of March, 1779, and after the arrival of General Goddard at Bombay, that a copy of Mr. Elliott's original instructions was received by the President and Select Committee, and the nature of the proposed alliance with Modajee Bosla fully explained to them.

Another circumstance deserves mentioning, as it tends farther to display the inconsistency and duplicity of the Bengal government throughout this business in the most striking colours; which is, that on the 15th of October, 1778, they wrote to the presidency of Bombay, generally advising them of the friendly disposition of the Berar Rajah, but acquainting them, that as Mr. Elliott was dead, they proposed to wait for advices from the Rajah before they appointed any other person to succeed him. They at the same time authorise the gentlemen of Bombay to "give orders to the officer commanding the Bengal detachment, to proceed forwards in support of the plan for reinstating Ragoba in the regency, if they think such a step necessary."

The unfortunate issue of the expedition from Bombay to accomplish that object is too well known to require a description in this place. The malicious exertions of party have operated in secret, and the impressions made by a generous sense of national disgrace and loss, have publicly and powerfully united to load the unhappy actors in that distressful scene with every species of reproach and infamy, and even to plunge them into irremediable ruin.

It is not the intention of the author of these sheets to join in the popular cry, or to wipe off the odium which has aspersed their characters. It is a subject he does not mean to discuss. But justice as well as humanity generally claims the impartial testimony of his pen on this occasion; and the enquiring eye of unprejudiced truth will trace the failure of the enterprize to a source far different from the supposed misconduct of those men, who had the immediate management and direction of it.

It will discover the certain seeds of disappointment in a distrust and jealousy which early took place between the two presidencies, which destroyed every ground of mutual confidence, and which, by producing open neglect on the one part, and secret resentment on the other, ultimately defeated the views of both, and ended in the most fatal and ruinous consequences to the public.

It will see the Governor General and Council of Bengal preferring a favourite scheme projected by themselves, yet, as if conscious of its extravagance and absurdity, afraid of openly avowing that preference, and at the same time pursuing such unaccountable means, and issuing orders of so contradictory a nature, as to perplex, embarrass, and totally overturn the very plan they were bound by their own instructions and positive promises to support.

It will also see the presidency of Bombay in their turn, aware of this unlucky predilection, which interfered with their views, ingeniously contriving to deceive themselves as well as others into a belief of the strength and sufficiency of their cause, and without encouragement from any partizans of Ragoba, or waiting for the support of the Bengal detachment, (which

though delayed, must, they might have been confident, at last arrive) precipitately plunging into a contest to which they were unequal, and sacrificing the interests of their country to the feelings of resentment and the dictates of a selfish and jealous ambition.

These will be the latent causes and facts discernable by the keen and searching eye of truth, and their reality will be confirmed, by observing the line of conduct afterwards pursued by both parties. No crimination or enquiry into the behaviour of individuals, but an affected moderation on the part of the Bengal presidency, which in notorious cases of public delinquency is surely most unpardonable, and no accusation of, or reflection upon, the particular measures of the Bombay government, in order to account for, and explain the causes of the late miscarriage, which was certainly due to public justice, and absolutely necessary for their own vindication.

In short, a mutual consciousness of the large share each had contributed to the public misfortunes, made neither party desirous of too minute an enquiry into the transactions which led to them, and they judged it for the common interest to adopt a system of forbearance and moderation, which they have since maintained towards each other with a tolerable degree of temper, but from which it is probable they will now very shortly depart.

After the return of the Bombay army from Tilliagong, and the arrival of the Bengal detachment at Surat, on the 25th of February, 1779, an event that, exclusive of any merit derived from it in a political light, reflected equal honour upon the courage and discipline of the troops, and the military skill and abilities of the officer who commanded and conducted them across the

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the peninsula, the first material circumstance that occurred, was the receipt of a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 5th of the same month, appointing General Goddard their minister at the Mharatta court.

The instructions that accompanied, were prepared under a probable belief of the enterprize in favour of Ragonaut Row having succeeded, and were calculated for entering upon a negociation with that chief.

A situation of affairs in the Mharatta empire, so widely different from what the Bengal government expected when they drew up the instructions, had of course rendered them entirely usefess and inapplicable when they arrived, and accordingly the General wrote to Bengal, that he should defer making known to the administration at Poonah the commission with which he was intrusted, until he could receive farther instructions.

I must, however, give a short extract from the Bengal Council's letter here, as it marks so strongly their disappointment at the supposed success of a measure, which, though not of their own formation, they are forced to acknowledge was authorized by them; and, indeed, the tendency of the letter altogether was such, and expressed so pointedly their determination of prosecuting the plan in favour of Modajee at a future opportunity, that I make no doubt, had even Ragoba been raised to the government, another revolution must shortly have been attempted.

After acknowledging the receipt of General Goddard's letters from Houffungabad, of the 4th and 6th of January, communicating the failure of his negociation with the Berar Rajah, they proceed as follows: " We are very much concerned that Modajee Boira

„ should have so far distrusted the powers with which
 „ you were invested, as to suppose that any engage-
 „ ments formed by the President and Council of Bom-
 „ bay, could preclude the accomplishment of a treaty
 „ with him, if such had been concluded, and there-
 „ fore, that he declined to enter into the proposed ne-
 „ gociation. If a treaty had been executed by you on
 „ the prescribed terms, it would have been our duty
 „ to enforce it in preference to any made at Bombay,
 „ and to have taken care, that no conditions in which
 „ that presidency might have bound itself, should have
 „ operated to the prejudice of our engagements. But
 „ in the present situation of things, we approve and
 „ applaud the prudence and active zeal for the inte-
 „ rests of the Company which you have shewn, in the
 „ resolution so immediately taken on receipt of the
 „ requisition from the President and Select Committee
 „ of Bombay, to relinquish the prosecution of the
 „ commission which had been especially entrusted to
 „ you, and to proceed with the detachment under your
 „ command to support the measures, in which that pre-
 „ sidency was actually engaged, and in which they had
 „ so far committed the safety and prosperity of their
 „ own government, and perhaps the general welfare
 „ of the Company, as to require every aid that could
 „ possibly be given to them.

„ As the treaty concluded by the President and Se-
 „ lect Committee of Bombay with Ragonaut Row was
 „ declared to be made under our sanction and autho-
 „ rity, and as we actually did grant our consent to
 „ such a treaty on the 17th of August, 1778, we are
 „ determined to abide by and support it, notwith-
 „ standing the total change which has since taken
 „ place in the circumstances under which it was pro-
 „ posed

“ posed to us, and the new measures which we have
 “ ourselves adopted on the supposed failure of those
 “ planned by the presidency of Bombay.”

Speaking of the alliance with Modajee, they use the following expressive words. “ However we may be
 “ restrained by motives of policy from prosecuting
 “ this measure, under the circumstances which have
 “ caused the suspension of it, we are by no means pre-
 “ cluded by the terms of the treaty with Ragoba; the
 “ pretension of Bolla to the Râuge or sovereign autho-
 “ rity of the Mharatta state, existing independently of
 “ any connections betwixt the English East-India Com-
 “ pany and Ragoba, and being perfectly reconcilable
 “ with them.”

On the 5th of the succeeding April, the Governor General and Council having then received authentic accounts of the defeat of the Bombay army, and of the disgraceful convention made at Worgaum with the ministerial leaders for its safe and unmolested return, together with the several transactions subsequent to that unfortunate event, thought proper to furnish * General Goddard with fresh credentials, as their minister at the court of Poonah, and to empower him to negotiate a treaty, the express object of which was “ to renew or
 “ confirm that formerly concluded by Colonel Upton,
 “ provided the Mharattas would previously agree to
 “ recede from the pretensions they had acquired by the
 “ late engagements of Messrs. Carnac and Egerton,
 “ and agree not to admit any French forces into their
 “ dominions, or allow that nation to form establish-
 “ ments on the Mharatta coast.”

* It was at this time he was also advanced from the rank of Colonel to that of Brigadier-general, with every flattering encomium and mark of distinction.

Under these restrictions, and with this latitude of action, excepting that authority was farther granted to relax in some trifling points relative to Colonel Upton's treaty, which, it is curious to observe, were once deemed of so great importance, as to constitute the declared ground of a rupture betwixt the two States, a negociation was opened by General Goddard at Surat, and carried on with the most unremitting assiduity and zeal during the months of August, September, and October, 1779; at the expiration of which period, a positive answer was received from Poonah to the proposals transmitted by the General, for the minister's consideration and acceptance, and in consequence of the determined spirit of hostility which dictated it, all farther negociation was immediately broke off, and the Mharatta vakeels returned to their master.

It has been ill-naturedly suggested, and continues to be the malicious endeavour of those, who, upon the illiberal principles of a mistaken policy, think they are rendering a service to the Bombay administration, by fixing a large share of blame upon the Governor General and Council, because the latter necessarily took upon themselves the care and responsibility, to attribute the failure of General Goddard's negociation to an unreasonable obstinacy and severity in the demands he was instructed to make, and to a wanton and studied wish on his part to involve the Company in a war, the management of which would be left to him.

This suspicion, however, must be proved to be as false as it is ungenerous, when circumstances come to be explained; and candour will not only simply acquit, but in justice acknowledge, that every proper effort was used to bring about a peace, and that the failure of the negociation, and subsequent renewal of hostilities,

ties, was occasioned by the influence of the sentiments which then prevailed in the Mharatta councils, and which determined the minister to reject all overtures for an accommodation, and to put no farther trust in a power, whose late perfidious breach of faith had proved it to be totally undeserving of a generous confidence, and incapable of a friendly alliance, unless where it perfectly suited with particular views of convenience, or was dictated by necessity.

In this latter point of view he certainly considered our advances, and was therefore the more easily led to presume, upon his late success at Telliagong, to hope that the Peishwa's arms would once more triumph, and prove superior to our military exertions.

Add to this, the resentment the minister must naturally feel at being so egregiously duped by a sham convention on our part, and at the ungrateful return we made for his moderation and mercy, together with the determined enmity we discovered towards him, in continuing to afford protection to Ragonaut Row, and we shall then find the true cause which prolonged the Mharatta war, and which drove Nana Furnese into an unnatural alliance and confederacy with Hyder Ally. This confederacy, to which Nizam Ally and Modajee Bofla acceded, was formed so early as the period I am now speaking of, and General Goddard gave intelligence of it to the Governor General and Council in the month of September, 1779.

I shall dismiss the subject of this negotiation by generally observing, that the spirit of the Bengal government's instructions was certainly calculated to promote a just and honourable peace, and that the actual state of circumstances at that time would not have justified their agreeing to one of a different nature.

It would not, however, be doing justice to General Goddard, to be totally silent regarding the exertions he used to render them effectual, and therefore I shall give a brief abstract of his conduct.

The vakeels from the Poonah court did not arrive at Surat till the middle of August, previous to which, he had, by every means his situation afforded, endeavoured to impress the ministers with an idea of his pacific and friendly intentions, in protecting and encouraging the subjects of the Mharatta state.

This conduct he persisted in after the arrival of the vakeels.* In explaining the several points of the negotiation, he invariably expressed himself in a language the most moderate, though firm, and in terms which fully proved a sincere desire to become the instrument of a perfect reconciliation betwixt the two states. He wrote to the minister, accompanying the proposals for peace, that as soon as he had communicated his approbation of them, in order to prevent every avoidable delay, he (the General) would immediately set out for Poonah; and a considerable time elapsing without any explicit answer being received to the propositions which had been transmitted, he dispatched Lala Nehal

* The following extract from the Governor General and Council's letter, dated Sept. 16, 1779, proves the political address and moderation of his conduct: " We observe with some
 " degree of pleasure, the notice taken by the Mharatta govern-
 " ment, in their letters to you, of the liberal attention which
 " you had shewn to the interests of that state, in the protection
 " given to their aumils in Guzarat against the irregularities of
 " Ragoba's dependants, and we recommend a continuation of
 " the same kindness and moderation in all your conduct to-
 " wards them."

Chund, one of the two Mharatta agents, fully instructed, and properly encouraged, to his master.

This man carried the proposed conditions in writing; nor was it till his return to Surat, with the following positive declaration on the part of the minister, viz. " That he could not make peace with the English, unless they delivered up Ragonaut Row into his hands, and made immediate restitution of the island of Salsette," that the General, in obedience to the orders he had received from Bengal, broke off the negotiation, and dismissed the vakeels:

All hopes of peace being thus destroyed, it became necessary to prepare for hostilities, and the General accordingly proceeded to carry into execution, a plan of military operations which he had formed, with the concurrence and approbation of the Select Committee of Bombay; who, in addition to the powers he had received from Bengal, thought proper also to delegate to him the authority of their government, and to appoint him their minister with Futty Sing Row Guicowar, and such other chiefs in the Guzerat, as it might be necessary to engage in our interests for the more successful prosecution of the war.

It is proper here to observe, that the general conduct of the war, both in the formation of plans, and in the execution of them, was left to the choice and direction of General Goddard, guided by the advice and information of the Bombay Presidency; and as it marks the cordial union which at one period subsisted betwixt them, and the delicacy and moderation which distinguished the General's conduct, under circumstances so invidious and disgusting, it may not be amiss to transcribe the following extract of a letter from the honourable Governor General and Council, dated the

14th of June, 1779. “ We observe with the highest
 “ satisfaction the approbation which the Select Com-
 “ mittee of Bombay express at your conduct, and the
 “ ready disposition which you have shewn to assist in
 “ the execution of their designs. It is with pleasure
 “ that we have resolved to join with them in recom-
 “ mending you to the Court of Directors, for the ap-
 “ pointment of commander in chief at that Presidency,
 “ whenever there may be a vacancy,” &c.

Although by the escape of Ragonaut Row from the hands of their enemies in June 1779, and his arrival in the English camp, where General Goddard had judged it for the honour and interest of the Company to grant him and his family an asylum, and to promise him personal protection in the name and with the subsequent intire approbation of the Bengal government: I say, although from this circumstance, matters had reverted to the same state in which they were previous to the Tel-liagong expedition, it was not, however, found expedient to extend our connection with that unfortunate and unfriended chief beyond the mere assurance of personal safety, or to renew in any shape the engagements which had been formerly entered into with him by the Bombay government.

Fatal experience had already convinced us of the rooted aversion and enmity which prevailed against him throughout the Mharatta state; and that therefore we should little grace or strengthen our cause, by uniting it with the assertion of his unpopular and otherwise unsupported claims.

His presence in the case of a rupture with the Poonah administration, which had in spite of every effort proved unavoidable, was certainly of very beneficial consequence, in augmenting the fears of our enemies,
 and

and arming us with the means of injuring them more essentially if we proved successful, or of accommodating our difference with the greater ease and advantage, should we at any time wish to bring the war to a termination.

From all these considerations, it was left to time and future circumstances to determine the extent of our benefits to Ragonaut Row; and in the intermediate space, we entered upon the war avowedly as principals, compelled to it by the refusal of the Mharatta minister to accept of the just and reasonable conditions of peace we had proposed to him, which rendered hostilities on our part an act of self-preservation and defence.

The inferior estimation in which the cause of Ragonaut was necessarily held, and the little influence it had upon the future operations of the war, might almost render an apology requisite for having suffered it to engage so much present attention: but the best excuse to be made is, that I shall here take leave of him, and that most probably his name will not once occur during the remainder of this narrative.

On the first of January, 1780, the army under General Goddard, reinforced by a small detachment of Bombay troops, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Hartley, crossed the river Tappy, on its route to Guzerat. ✓

It had been resolved to commence the campaign with the settlement of that province, and the General lost no time in accomplishing an object, which, besides the great importance of it to the general success of the war, it was particularly necessary should be finally adjusted previous to the arrival of the Mharatta forces in the neighbourhood, lest their presence should intimi-

date, and fix decidedly in the Peishwa's interest, Futtu Sing Guicowar, whose inclination at the best could only be supposed to be wavering; and we should by that means be constrained to confine our operations to the opposition of their united strength, under every possible disadvantage, and without any acquisition of revenue or improvement of resource whatever.

I have already premised, that it is not my intention to swell this narrative, by a minute description and detail of military operations, but it is with no small reluctance and regret that I must on the present occasion decline a task, which, from the various proofs it affords of skilful conduct in the commander, and of disciplined valour in the troops, would so pleasingly gratify my private feelings, and allow such ample scope to animated language, and all the force of nervous eloquence: justice, however, requires that I should generally bear testimony to a merit so distinguished; and while I mention the many and striking advantages derived to the Company by the operations of this campaign, I cannot help celebrating the able exertions and gallant spirit of those, by whose united labours and perseverance they were acquired.

The province of Guzerat could only be settled by the two following modes, either by a union of interests with Futtu Sing, or by forcibly wresting it out of his hands.

Every idea of reason and good policy dictated the former, if it could possibly be effected. Upon the eve of engaging in a war with the most powerful state in Hindostan, and unsupported by any friend or ally, nay, even suspicious of the designs of those princes who then professed a neutrality, it surely was a point of the

first

first consideration, to conciliate and attach Futtu-Sing to our cause, since by so doing we secured to ourselves the immediate possession of a considerable tract of country, and, as it has since proved, the unmolested possession of its revenue ; an object at that time absolutely essential for enabling us to enter upon hostilities with vigour and effect ; whereas, if Futtu Sing had continued inimical to us, no present provision could possibly have been made for the future prosecution of the war ; the province of Guzerat must have been totally desolated and destroyed, and even such parts of it as we might have been able to possess ourselves of, must have been exposed to the constant inroads and ravages of a depredatory enemy. Under the full conviction of these self-evident truths, the General was himself exceedingly desirous, and had it in charge from the Select Committee of Bombay, to adjust amicably with Futtu Sing the settlement of the country, and to render him, if possible, a serviceable ally to the Company.

The general character of the man, and the very strong prejudices entertained against him by some individuals at Bombay, who, by a strange abuse and perversion of justice, chose to stigmatize him with the perfidious stains which, in reason ought to have sullied the English name, for their treacherous conduct towards him on a former occasion, naturally excited in the mind of the General the strongest doubts and apprehensions, of the little confidence that could be placed in any promises or declarations, however specious and friendly in appearance, which the Rajah might be induced to make, in order to preserve himself from the ruin which then threatened to overwhelm him.

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The fears of meeting with a treatment similar to what he had before experienced, * might also make Futty Sing on his part doubtful and suspicious of our proffered friendship; and these considerations, joined to the dread of the Mharatta power, and of the punishment their vengeance would certainly inflict, seemed to create innumerable difficulties and obstacles to the attainment of a friendly, sincere, and permanent connection betwixt the Company and that chief.

These unpromising circumstances, however, only served to encrease the General's solicitude and ardour to accomplish an object of such importance, and so essential to the successful prosecution of the war. He applied himself, therefore, to it with an earnest assiduity and zeal, that fully proved the disinterested spirit which governed his actions, and taught him to prefer the conscious satisfaction of procuring a solid and certain benefit to the public, to the false glare of a narrow private ambition, or the seducing charms of a rapacious avarice, both of which, the exclusive conquest of Guzerat and the ruin of Futty Sing would have gratified in their fullest extent.

Sensible of the good effects which the rapid movements and approach of the army would produce upon

* In the year 1775, when the Bombay forces were in the field, in support of Ragonaut Row's pretensions, Futty Sing, after a long negotiation through the mediation of the English commander, and under the faith of the Company, was prevailed upon to risque an interview, when he was forcibly made prisoner by Ragoba, compelled to agree to the payment of a large sum of money, and not suffered to return to his capital of Baroda, until he had sent for his daughter, a child of six or seven years of age, and delivered her up as a security for the performance of the engagements violently extorted from him.

Putty Sing's counsels, the General left the banks of the river Tappy on the 5th of January, and on the 15th crossed the Nerbuddah at Bowapone-Gaut, where he was joined by some battering cannon and stores from Baroche, a place of considerable strength and commerce, upon the northern bank of the same river, and governed by a chief and council under the Bombay Presidency. On the 19th the army reached Dubhoy, a considerable walled town belonging to the Mharattas, which the garrison abandoned the night after the troops arrived before it.

The negotiation with Futtu Sing had been carried on, without interrupting the progress of the march, through the means of vakeels on his part, that passed to and from the camp; and by the influence of a moderation that does the General infinite honour, joined to the greatest perseverance and address, the Rajah was at length won over to our views, and agreed to an alliance with the Company upon the terms proposed to him.

The treaty was finally concluded on the 26th of January, at a village called Condeala, about four or five miles from Baroda, Futtu Sing's capital, and half way betwixt the latter and our encampment.

By this treaty, the peace and tranquillity of Guzerat was secured upon the most firm and solid basis, an immediate resource of revenue was provided, and that in a manner the least expensive and hazardous to the Company; and the certain and speedy settlement of the province, gave us leisure to turn our arms to new and more necessary, though, perhaps, less beneficial conquests.

It was with the utmost visible and natural reluctance, that Futtu Sing was prevailed upon to accept of the
country

country to be conquered from the Mharattas, north of the river Myhie, in exchange for an equal proportion of lands to the southward ; nor is this unwillingness on his part to be wondered at, since, although by uniting his possessions in one regular and connected chain, he would be a similar gainer with ourselves, and although the revenues of the country to be mutually exchanged, differed very little in their amount, the real and intrinsic value of the lands could bear no manner of comparison ; and in lieu of a territory, fertile, well cultivated, and to be collected at little or no expence, we put him in possession of a track, it is true, more extensive, but wild and without culture, inhabited by a fierce and unruly people, and constantly exposed to the ravages of a plundering banditti, which rendered the maintenance of a considerable military force at all times requisite, to preserve the tranquillity of the country, and to enforce the collections.

Before I pursue my narrative, it may not be improper to give a brief account of the Guzerat province, and an historical account of the Guicowar family, who possess the greatest part of it, from their original founder, Pillajee. This man was grandfather to the present reigning prince, and being a very warlike and able chief, attended Sahoo, Rajah of Setterah, in his wars, and obtained, as a reward for his services, the province of Guzerat, the greatest part of which he had himself conquered from the Mahommedan princes, who at that time governed it in the name of the Mogul emperors.

This rich and extensive kingdom, for as such it has ever been distinguished in the histories of the east, was conferred upon Pillajee in jaghire, but by a more full and independent tenure than is usually granted to the jaghire officers amongst the Mharattas.

After

After his death, his son Damajee succeeded, and upon some differences he had with the Mharatta government, was prevailed upon to repair to Poonah, in order to accommodate them, when he was treacherously made prisoner, and compelled to agree to a partition of country with the Peishwa; and to enter into such engagements as were dictated to him; before he could obtain his release.

From that period, the administration at Poonah found means to interfere more immediately in the settlement and government of the province, and the Mharatta forces, under Ragonaut Row, in conjunction with those of Damajee, laid siege, but without success, to the capital Ahmedabad; nor was it wrested from the possession of the Musselmans so much by superior foreign force, as it was at last betrayed into the hands of the confederates by domestic treason and treachery.

After the demise of Damajee, Futtu Sing succeeded, in preference to his elder brother Seajee, who, being disordered in his intellects, was judged incapable of governing. This unfortunate chief resides contentedly at Soan Ghur, a fort belonging to the family, where he is treated with every mark of attention, and has liberty to amuse himself in those innocent pursuits, which his insanity, perfectly inoffensive in its nature, constitutes the only objects and employment of his life.

Gouind Row, another son of Damajee, but by a different mother, though younger than Futtu Sing, lays claim to the succession, under pretext of the preferable right which the offspring of the lawful wife possesses over that of the favourite concubine. This distinction, however, is contrary to nature, and the established customs of the east, and Futtu Sing has been formally

acknowledged by the Poonah durbar, and received the investiture of his authority from the nominal Rajah of Setterah.

Until the time of Aurungzebe, and while the Mogul empire continued to flourish, Guzerat was esteemed one of the most opulent provinces dependant upon it. It is difficult to conceive a more intire revolution than what has since taken place. The imbecility of succeeding monarchs, conspiracies and civil wars in the centre of the empire, and a total relaxation, and decay of vigour, through all the remote and extended provinces of it, univerfally encouraged the viceroys to assert an independence in their respective governments, nor was the Soubah of Guzerat more disposed to give proofs of attachment and loyalty than the rest.

This separation and dismemberment of the empire, proved most favourable to invaders, who attacked, and with ease possessed themselves of the divided provinces; and it was about this time that the Mharattas broke forth from the mountains of the Decan, and, spreading slaughter and desolation wherever they directed their destructive steps, terrified and subdued the effeminate and degenerated descendants of those Mahommedan conquerors, who had themselves so courageously established their empire in Hindostan, by the edge of the sword, and the terror of their arms.

Some of them, unable to stem the torrent, abandoned every thing to its rage; and others, satisfied with a temporary relief, and the indulgence of present ease, attempted to divert its course, by the payment of large sums of money, or cessions of territory.

The province of Guzerat, as has been already observed, soon fell into their hands. With the loss of
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the capital Ahmedabad, the Mogul authority became totally annihilated, and the descendants of the Nawâb Cummaul ul dien, the family which was then dispossessed of government, now reside in obscurity upon a small jaghire, allowed them in the neighbourhood of Puttan, under the protection and jealous vigilance of Fuddy Sing.

The only vestiges of the Musselman dominion which now remain, are Surat and Cambait, the former situated towards the mouth of the river Tappy, and the latter on that of the Myhie. These places are possessed by their respective Mahommedan governors, or, as they stile themselves, Nawâbs, but their authority is confined within the walls, and even the scanty revenue of this circumscribed extent, they share with the Mharattas, who receive a fixed and very considerable proportion.

Besides the two large rivers above mentioned, this province is also watered by a third, the Nerbuddah, which rises in the hills of Boghilhund, and, after running a western course of about one thousand miles, through the rich provinces of Malwa, Chandesh, and Guzerat, empties itself into the gulph of Cambait, a little below the town of Baroche, which was conquered by the English from its Nawâb a few years ago.

A situation so favourable for commerce could not possibly be overlooked, and we accordingly find, that this province, and especially the town of Surat, has always carried on a most extensive and advantageous trade, and was formerly considered as the grand emporium of the Mogul's dominions, supplying the most interior and remote corners of them with every useful commodity, nay, even with every superfluity and luxury

of life, which the hand of foreign invention or industry could contrive or produce.

Its own fertility, arising from the nature and situation of the soil, being a low flat land, and intersected with many smaller streams, besides those large rivers already mentioned, enabled it to export great quantities of cotton, indigo, wheat and other grains; and the improved state of its manufactures amply supplied articles for foreign markets, in exchange for the valuable productions purchased from them.

I shall finish this digression with a short account of the city of Ahmedabad, which has long been esteemed as the capital of the province. It is situated upon the east bank of the Sabremetty Nuddy, a pleasant, wholesome, and constant, though small stream, that runs into the Myhie, and it was originally founded by Shaw Ahmed, King of Guzerat, who flourished near four centuries ago. The walls, which still remain, are about six miles in circumference, and there is a very wide and deep ditch carried all round. Besides this ditch, new works have been since constructed, where the original defences, either from decay or situation, were judged insufficient; and upon the whole, it may be pronounced a very strong and formidable place, especially when garrisoned, as it was at the time when General Goddard besieged it, by about six thousand Arab and Sindy foot and two thousand horse.

There are twelve gateways, by which you pass in and out of the city; and the extensive circuit of the walls, particularly at these gateways, appears to have been ornamented, at regular distances, with towers and cupolas, which in the days of its splendour, must have equally contributed to the magnificence and strength of the place. Within the city, and upon the

bank

bank of the river, is an extensive enclosure, called the Budder, which was formerly the royal residence : it has been strongly fortified, and entirely commands the principal bazars, courts of justice, and streets where the palaces of the chief nobles were situated. At present, so much is this city decayed, and fallen from its original flourishing condition, that not more than a quarter of the space within the walls is inhabited, whereas, from infallible vestiges, and ruins regularly to be traced, the suburbs must formerly have extended beyond them to the distance of three miles round. ✓

Ahmedabad is the Mahomedan capital of Guzerat, the work of Ahmed and his successors, who enlarged and beautified it out of the ruins of the ancient Hindoo cities Narwalla and Chappaneer. Baroche and Puttan, the latter of which is, I believe, a more modern name for Narwalla, are also of great antiquity ; but of all these, little more than the name exists at present ; and the Guicowar capital is called Baroda, recently founded upon the banks of the Biswamuntry Nuddy, and situated betwixt the Myhie and Nerbuddah, about twelve miles south of the former. ✓

In Ahmedabad is still to be seen the mosque and tomb of Ahmed, its founder, built entirely of stone and marble. Great taste, skill, and expence, must have been exerted on these structures, which are curious and magnificent, and remain perfect and uninjured by the ruthless hand of all-destroying time.

Many superb ruins, both within and without the walls, merit a particular description ; but I have already digressed sufficiently, and shall now return to the subject of my narrative, after observing, that Guzerat continued to be governed by a succession of its own kings, until the reign of Acbar, when it was finally subjected,

subjected, and made a province of the Mogul empire, the wretched fate of which it afterward shared, as has been already described.

In conformity to the engagements made with Futy Sing, for putting him in immediate possession of the Mharatta share of the country, north of the Myhie, the army marched from the neighbourhood of Baroda, and arriving before Ahmedabad the 10th of February, upon a refusal of the governor, on the part of the Peishwa, to surrender, besieged and stormed it the 15th in the morning. It was carried after a gallant and desperate resistance, and about four hundred of the enemy were killed in the assault. Most of these fell in the ditch and one of the gateways, where, endeavouring to escape into the town as our grenadiers advanced, they were stopped by the narrowness of the passage and wicket, and falling one upon another, crowded together in a heap, their ammunition blowing up in their cartouch boxes, and every man perishing before relief could be given.

The troops distinguished themselves by every proof of discipline and humanity, injuring no person they found in the place unarmed, and in the fury of attack, sparing even many who laid down their arms and submitted. The prisoners, amongst whom were some Arab Jemedars, were treated with the greatest clemency, and those that were wounded, received into our hospital, humanely taken care of, and afterwards released*.

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A circumstance similar to the following, must give more heartfelt pleasure to a humane and liberal mind, than the most splendid triumphs of victory: "an officer of the Bombay establishment,

On the 26th of February, Fatty Sing was formally put in possession of Ahmedabad, and the settlement of the Guzerat perfected, and its future tranquillity effectually secured, in less than two months from putting the troops in motion.

This acquisition was by no means of the value or importance to Fatty Sing, which, from the reputation of its being the capital, one would be led to suppose. A considerable part of its revenue, the whole of which did not exceed three lacks, had been before received by him, and of the collections of the country, north of the Myhie, more than two-thirds had always belonged to the Guicowar; so that, in fact, we did little else than put him in possession of his own country, and this he was to maintain and defend in future, at the expence of a garrison which had before been paid by the Peishwa. The attainment of Ahmedabad was, besides, not the object of Fatty Sing's wish: on the contrary, he was totally averse to it, and to the whole of the proposed partition of territory, which included that city in his share.

It became, therefore, an object of political consideration, to gild the pill we had thus forced him to swallow, and make it as palatable as possible; accordingly, General Goddard exerted himself, to render the real as well as ideal value of the place as important in Fatty Sing's eyes as he could. For the reasons already men-

tioned, who belonged to a small party of sepoys, which was employed, soon after the storm of Ahmedabad, in the Concar, and had been defeated, fell into the hands of the Mharattas, and by the influence of an Arab Jemadar, who declared his motive for interceding was, in grateful acknowledgement of the humane treatment his countrymen had met with from General Goddard, obtained his liberty, and returned to Bombay "

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tioned, he found it as impossible to give up the city to plunder, as it would have been unjust and impolitic to insist upon the Rajah's ransoming it, by the payment of a sum of money to the troops; and he therefore used every precaution to prevent a general pillage, in which their good conduct and discipline fortunately enabled him to succeed; but his regard for their interests, and desire of rewarding their valour, must have made him afterwards not sorry to learn, that a partial prize had fallen to their share; and to this circumstance he found means to reconcile Futty Sing, although many, and no doubt exaggerated complaints, were daily made; and one merchant in the city estimated his own loss at above fifty thousand rupees. It is proper here to mention, that the greatest part of the property belonging to the inhabitants had been conveyed away to places of security previous to the siege; and almost the whole of the little that remained, was the property of people connected with or immediately dependent upon the Guicowar.

Previous to, and during the siege of Ahmedabad, accounts were daily brought of the great military preparations making at Poonah, and it was soon known that Scindia and Holkar had descended the gauts with a large army, and advanced towards Baroda, Futty Sing's capital. General Goddard put the troops in motion as expeditiously as possible, and leaving Ahmedabad the 2d of March, crossed the Myhie the 6th, and encamped about two miles from Baroda, on the Biswanuntry Nuddy the 8th.

Scindia and Holkar, with their whole force, had moved off to the eastward, about twelve or fourteen miles from Baroda, and about the same distance from

Powan Ghur, * a very strong fortress belonging to Scindia, situated upon an exceeding high and almost inaccessible mountain, and separating the two provinces of Malwa and Guzerat. Their united force consisted of at least forty thousand men, most of which were horse, and they had with them a few light pieces of cannon only, having sent away all of a larger size, as well as every species of heavy baggage which could encumber or retard the celerity of their motions.

On the 9th, Messrs. Farmer and Stewart, who had been left with Mahadjee Scindia, as hostages for the faithful performance of the convention of Worgaum, arrived in camp with letters from that chief and Holkar, generally expressive of their friendly sentiments, and of the inclination of the Mharattas to live upon terms of amity with the English; as a proof of which, they had given the above gentlemen their dismissal, and instructed them, in conjunction with Abajee Shabajee, to make a full representation of matters to General Goddard.

A conduct so promising and friendly in appearance, excited the most sanguine expectations of soon effecting a peace with the Mharatta State, or, at least, of bringing about some separate agreement with Mahadjee Scindia, which might be productive of the most important benefits to the Company, in the final settlement of their disputes with that nation. It was, therefore, matter of the greatest concern to the General, to see his hopes ultimately disappointed, and all his efforts for that desirable end unluckily defeated.

* The ancient city of Chappaneer stood at the foot of this mountain, and a small town still exists, under the same name, and upon the same spot, which is subject to Scindia.

He endeavoured, by every assurance and argument in his power, to impress the mind of Scindia with a belief of the sincere wish of the English for peace, and of the particular sentiments of regard they entertained for himself, of which they were ready to give the most strong and convincing proofs.

He suggested some conditions mutually beneficial, on which they were desirous of uniting with him, in settling the administration of the empire upon a proper and solid basis, and failing in this attempt of separating Scindia from the minister Nana Furnese, for which every opening was given, he also pointed out such terms in an alliance with the present government, as the English had a right, founded both in justice and reason, to expect, and were ready to accede to.

A very few days, however, fully convinced the General of the inefficacy of his own endeavours, and of the insincerity of Scindia's professions. Abajee Shabajee returned with proposals from his master, which positively proved his intimate connection with Nana Furnese, and were, indeed, of a nature, if possible, more disgraceful than those before made by the minister himself, requiring the surrender of Ragoba's person into his hands, and also of his son Badjerow, the former of whom was to reside at Jancy, upon the allowance Scindia had before settled for his subsistence, and to relinquish all share in the administration, which was in future to be conducted by Scindia, in the name of Badjerow, upon whom the appointment of Dewan to the Peishwa Madhurow Narain should be conferred. No express advantage was proposed to be stipulated for the English in return for these concessions: on the contrary, Scindia meant to have it understood, that they were to adhere to the engagements made at Worgaum.

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Upon the whole, it plainly appeared, that Scindia was not in reality so amicably disposed, as his behaviour respecting Messrs. Farmer and Stewart gave room to conjecture; or that, if he was desirous of peace, there did not exist any reasonable hope of his intention to conclude a treaty, but upon terms that were judged dishonourable previous to the campaign, and which in the midst of our present success would have been deemed highly inadequate and disgraceful.

Thus ended the negociation with Scindia, and though the General, towards the close of the campaign, and after the superiority of our arms over the Mharattas had been repeatedly asserted, availed himself of an opportunity of some indirect overtures made by Scindia through Futtu Sing, to renew the negociation, this second attempt proved equally unsuccessful with the former.

The military operations, after the return of the army from Ahmedabad, were confined, on the part of Scindia, to a determined system of avoiding an engagement, and on that of the English, to every possible exertion to induce him to alter his resolution. ✓

For this purpose, the General twice advanced with the whole army, and encamped upon the ground which Scindia had occupied, and from which he had precipitately retired as we advanced. A third time, with a part of the army only, viz. two hundred European infantry, ten companies of grenadier sepoys, two Bengal and one Bombay battalion, two twelve and ten six-pounder pieces of artillery, and about seven or eight hundred horse, he formed and attempted a plan of surprizing the enemy's camp. Their vigilance and excessive caution, however, prevented his advancing undiscovered beyond their grand guard of six thousand men,

which was near two miles from the main army ; and when he reached the encampment after day-light, he found the whole drawn up ready for action.

This appearance encouraged a hope, that the important moment at last arrived, when the enemy, presuming upon their numbers, would avail themselves of the opportunity which offered, of contending with only a part of our force, and stand the decision of a battle ; but this hope proved fallacious, and after a few brisk though partial skirmishes, the Mharattas entirely abandoned the field to the conquerors, who remained upon it about two hours, and then returned without loss, to their own camp.

These signal triumphs most strikingly evinced the superiority of our arms, and wiped off the stain they had contracted from the late unlucky disaster at Worgaum. They were, besides, the only successes to be gained over an enemy who would not fight, and who, it is probable, wished for nothing more than to draw us on beyond the proper line of our policy, and the defence of our new conquests, to an unprofitable pursuit of his army into the Malwa province ; which, besides exposing our valuable acquisitions in Guzerat, would also have endangered the safety of the presidency of Bombay itself, at this time threatened with an attack from the French ; and even admitting our endeavours to have been so far successful, as that our arms had penetrated to Ugein Scindia's capital, they could not possibly have produced any benefit at all proportioned to the risque, or decisive towards terminating the war.

The two armies continued on the confines of Malwa and Guzerat until the month of May, when they separated, on account of the approaching monsoon, Scindia

dia marching off to Ugein, and the English returning to Surat, where they arrived the beginning of June.

It would be unjust not to mention the particular services of Major John Forbes and Captain John Campbell, the former of whom surprised and defeated a considerable party of the enemy under one of their principal leaders; and the latter, who commanded two battalions of Bengal sepoy's upon a foraging party, being attacked at the distance of at least ten miles from camp, by near fifteen thousand of Scindia's best horse, after killing a considerable number, forced the rest to retire, and saved not only his party, but brought the forage he had collected safe to camp.

I shall conclude this general sketch of the Guzerat campaign, with a short testimony to the merit and gallantry of Lieutenant Welsh, who commanded a corps of three hundred Mogul cavalry, and was detached with that corps, and one battalion of sepoy's, to surprise and beat up the quarters of Gunnesse Punt, one of the ministerial chiefs, who with about six thousand men infested the neighbourhood of Surat.

The distance was about fifty miles, and Lieutenant Welsh had moved with such secrecy and rapidity, that Gunnesse Punt was unapprised of his approach. He contrived so as to reach the encampment early in the morning; but perceiving the day would soon break, he ordered the infantry and guns to follow as expeditiously as possible, and putting himself at the head of the cavalry only, rushed forward into the midst of the enemy, who, terrified by the impetuosity of an assault so sudden and unexpected, fled on all sides, and left their guns and baggage a prize to the victors.

This gallant enterprize was succeeded by the surrender of Parneiro, a fort built upon an high hill, and
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from its situation, if properly defended, capable of defying the most formidable force. The acquisition of this, with the smaller forts in its vicinity, which Lieutenant Welsh also took, entirely completed the conquest of the Guzerat province, of which Parneiro may be termed the southern limit.

Previous to his marching against this place, Lieutenant Welsh received a small reinforcement of sepoy, with battering cannon and stores, from Mr. Boddam, chief of Surat, whose name I should be unpardonable to mention, without bearing testimony at the same time to his zeal for the interests of the Company, which is ever active, and has conspicuously distinguished itself on various occasions; nor is he himself less remarkable for the integrity and disinterestedness of his public character, than for his many private virtues and amiable qualifications.

Thus terminated the first campaign of the Mharatta war; and General Goddard, besides the conscious satisfaction of having uniformly succeeded in every attempt he made against the enemy, and of having put the Company in possession of a territory yielding an annual revenue of thirty lacks of rupees, had a farther gratification, not the least pleasing to a generous mind, of receiving the most full and flattering testimonies from the government of Bengal, of their approbation of every part of his conduct, and the high sense they entertained of his services to the Company.

During the monsoon of 1780, nothing material occurred, except the important conquest of Gualior, achieved by Major Popham, who carried it in the most enterprising and gallant manner, and by a skilful and well concerted stratagem, that does the highest honour to his military talents and abilities.

In the preceding month of November, Major Popham had received the command of two thousand drafts, intended to reinforce General Goddard's army, but from various causes, principally from the danger of attempting to cross the peninsula with so small a force, the design was dropped, and a new plan adopted by the Governor General, for making a diversion in favour of the general operations of the war from the country of the Gohud Ranna, which should, in its consequences, involve a combination of the several Hindoo princes, interspersed through the province of Ajmeer, and to the northward of Malwa.

An attempt was accordingly made to negotiate with those petty chiefs, which unfortunately did not succeed in any adequate or useful degree; and the political as well as military operations of that quarter, were confined to an alliance with the Ranna of Gohud, and the recovery of his country from the Mharattas.

It was in the execution of this service that Major Popham signalized himself, and made the Company's name feared and respected throughout Hindostan, by planting the British colours upon the walls of Gualior, a fortress which had for ages been deemed impregnable, and where, as in a secure and inaccessible asylum, the Mogul emperors, in the days of their magnificence and power, had always confined the vanquished rivals of their greatness, and other eminent prisoners of state.

No means of reconciliation with the Mharattas could be found during the rainy season of the year 1780, and accordingly a renewal of hostilities became necessary.

After providing for the preservation and security of our acquisitions in Guzerat, the defence of which was committed to a detachment of our own troops, and a proportion of horse to be furnished by our ally, Futty Sing,

✓ Sing, the army marched from Surat the 16th of October, and arrived before Bassein about the middle of November. The battering cannon and stores were landed with all expedition, and the siege carried on with such unremitting vigour and alacrity, that on the ✓ 11th of December, a practicable breach being made, the garrison, consisting of at least six thousand men, capitulated and laid down their arms.

Thus by the bravery and good conduct of their troops, was the Company, in the very commencement of the second campaign, put in possession of a place, which had been long the object of their ardent wishes and most eager solicitude, and which, in the treaty made with Ragonaut Row in 1778, by the Bombay government; had been deemed of so great importance, as to constitute the most material article stipulated with him in behalf of the English, for investing him with the regency and entire administration of the Mharatta empire.

✓ The conquest of Bassein was soon followed by the surrender of Amoll, a small, though from its situation very tenable fort, upon an island about one thousand six hundred yards distant from that of Bassein, and whose possession is absolutely requisite to secure the unmolested enjoyment of Bassein itself. The garrisons of Tarrapore, Danôu, and other forts, situated along the sea coast of the Concan, thought proper to follow the ✓ same example; and at the end of the year 1780, the English, to the conquest of Guzerat, had added that of the largest and most valuable part of the Concan, and were actually masters of an extent of sea coast from Cambait to the mouth of the Pen river, which empties itself into Bombay harbour, of above three hundred miles.

Thus

Thus far we have conducted the Mharatta war, and from a contemplation of the past, so far from discovering any cause of regret for having commenced it, we should be led to entertain the most reasonable and well-grounded expectation, of being shortly able to bring it to a glorious and successful termination; since besides the conquests already made, we actually enjoyed, at the period above mentioned, means for its prosecution infinitely superior to what we originally possessed, or could have even hoped to acquire in so short a time from our own single and unassisted efforts.

Various causes, however, unfortunately contributed to disappoint this hope, the principal of which I acknowledge to have been the breaking out of the war with Hyder Ally Chawn, and the great and unexampled success of his arms in the Carnatic. I must also be of opinion, that the measures adopted for bringing about an accommodation were in their nature of so impolitic and dangerous a tendency, as to throw obstacles in the way of it, and by the eagerness and anxiety they betrayed, actually defeated the purpose they were intended to attain.

I shall have frequent occasion in the course of my narrative to elucidate this latter observation. I shall, therefore, at present confine myself to a description of the immediate effects of Hyder's unlucky interference, previous to which a short digression seems necessary for clearly comprehending the subject.

Although the controlling powers vested in the Governor General and Council, were certainly intended by the wisdom of the legislature, to guard against the destructive consequences, which an opposition of interests, and pursuit of separate views must unavoidably produce, if the different presidencies of India were

permitted to act independant of each other, (a system that, however consistent, or at least reconcileable with the inferior interests of a mere commercial body, could not possibly be applied to the situation of the Company as a great political power, which they are at present universally considered by the states of Hindostan) the transactions of the period I am now relating, fully prove, that even this controlling power is at present of too circumscribed a nature, and that, in order to give vigour and stability to the British empire in India, the first step to which requires a consistency and uniformity in political measures, it is absolutely necessary, that a full and unlimited authority, in all matters relative to peace or war, and in every negotiation with foreign states, be delegated to the Governor General and Council, and that the presidencies of Madras and Bombay be directed, not only to give implicit and unconditional obedience to their orders, but to consider themselves as immediately and solely responsible to the Council General for their conduct in the execution of them.

If this plan had been originally adopted, we should not afterwards have had to contend with the two most powerful states in India, the Mharattas and Hyder Ally, united with the combined strength of France and Holland; nor should we be now suing for peace at the feet of a vanquished enemy, who is reaping the harvest of wars he does not fight, and recovering in the Carnatic the territories he has, to every effort of his own force, irrecoverably lost in the Guzerat and Concan.

It is true, the three presidencies seem in one point to have been most cordial and unanimous, I mean in their resolution to make war; but although perfectly agreeing in the same general system, they unfortunately

ly differed materially in the particular object to which it should be directed.

In Bengal and in Bombay they mutually marked the Mharattas as the victims of their sanguinary vengeance, but they attempted their destruction by means totally dissimilar and irreconcilable ; and whilst the one party was actually in arms, struggling to exalt Ragonaut Row upon the ruins of his country, the other was equally active in opposing a rival to his greatness in the person of the Berar prince. ✓

In Madras, a conduct still more extraordinary and impolitic was adopted, and the business of the Guntoor Sarcar will be a lasting monument of the folly and bad faith of the nation, as well as a reproach to the persons who transacted it. In short, the records of that government, during the period of which I am now treating, exhibit scenes of a treacherous policy, weakness and corruption, which are not to be equalled in the annals of almost any age or country. It would be an endless task, and exceed the intended bounds of this narrative, to enter into a minute description of each particular transaction. — Suffice it to touch upon the subject generally. ✓

Notwithstanding the war then existing with the French and Mharattas, and a knowledge of the resentment already harboured by Hyder Ally against the English, the consequence of which was ever to be apprehended from the rooted rancour and animosity which Mahomed Ally and that chief mutually entertained, the government of Madras, so far from endeavouring to ward off the approaching evil by any temporising or moderate conduct, at once took a step that not only irritated and offended Hyder beyond any hope of reconciliation, but threatened in its consequences to draw

on the resentment of Nizam Ally, Soubah of the Deccan; nor could a rupture with the latter have been avoided, but by the wise and well-timed interposition of the Governor General and Council, who cancelled the engagements made with Bazalut Jung, contrary to the faith of treaties then subsisting betwixt the English and the Nizam, restored the Guntoor Sarcar, and by farther political advances and seasonable concessions, seconded by the ability and address of Mr. Holland, who was employed to negotiate at the court of Hyderabad, preserved the Nizam in his neutrality, and prevented him from giving any support to the Mharatta administration, with whom he was, and still continues to be, very closely connected.

To aggravate Hyder's feelings by every possible means, in addition to the seizure of the Guntoor Sarcar, and the detaching a force towards Adoni, Bazalut Jung's capital, to defend him against the resentment of his brother the Nizam and Hyder Ally, that force was directed to march through the territory of the latter, although by a small circuit, his country might have been entirely avoided.

This insult, added to former causes of provocation, and the engagements he had lately formed with the Mharatta minister, precipitated Hyder's hostile preparations, and in the middle of the year 1780 he descended the passes and entered the Carnatic, which, according to expectation, he found totally unprepared for defence, and unable to oppose or check his career.

The rapidity of his conquests and the fatal disaster which befel our arms near Conjeveram, are facts too well known, and too remarkable in their nature, to admit of being mentioned in this place, or even to require any comment. I shall, therefore, close this digression

gression by the following general reflection; that as the misconduct and imbecility of the Madras government was the cause of Hyder's immediately overrunning and destroying the Carnatic, and possessing himself of many of the principal fortresses almost without opposition, it is also to the operation of that original neglect, which rendered the country an intire desert, that we must ascribe both the subsequent failure of the efforts of the Governor General and Council, who strained every resource to relieve the distress of the Carnatic, and the insufficiency of Sir Eyre Coote's personal exertions, who has, however, acquired immortal glory, for having so long stemmed a torrent he was prevented from making effectual head against; and it is ultimately in the effects of this neglect, we must look for the embarrassment in which even our successes against the Mharattas have involved us, and the disappointment our hopes from them are likely to experience.

I have thus in some degree explained the causes as well as immediate consequences of the war with Hyder, and it now remains to describe the manner in which that event operated upon our contest with the Mharattas.

The first idea which naturally suggested itself to the Governor General and Council, after sending a supply of men and treasure to the coast, was to endeavour to terminate the Mharatta war, in order to employ their whole collected force in opposing Hyder, and driving him from the Carnatic. For this purpose proposals for an accommodation were transmitted to the Poonah administration, and copies of them separately forwarded to the President and Select Committee of Bombay and General Goddard, for their information and observation. The letter to the latter, dated October 9,
1780,

1780, concludes with the following paragraph: “ And
 “ we hereby positively require and command you im-
 “ mediately to suspend all hostilities and military ope-
 “ rations against the Mharattas, whenever you may
 “ receive a requisition in writing to that effect from
 “ the Peishwa, that the like order had been given on
 “ his part to the officer commanding his armies; but
 “ in the mean time, and until such requisition and no-
 “ tification be received by you, we direct that you pro-
 “ secute the war with the utmost vigour, and act in all
 “ circumstances as if the foregoing information had
 “ not been sent you.”

In the treaty transmitted, we offered to relinquish every conquest excepting Ahmedabad and Gualior, which had been guaranteed to Futty Sing, and the Ranna of Gohud, upon conditions of the Mharattas uniting with us in an offensive alliance against Hyder Ally, of whose dominions a conquest and mutual division was to be made. Should the Mharattas not accede to an offensive alliance, peace was nevertheless proposed, each party retaining what it had acquired, or a suspension of hostilities was to take place on both sides for one year from the date of the treaty, for the purpose of negotiating the terms of a future and perpetual adjustment. Some stipulations sufficiently favourable were proposed respecting Ragonaut Row, and Modajee Bosla's offer of mediation and guarantee on this occasion was declared to be accepted, himself permitted to become a party, and the treaty in consequence transmitted through him to the minister at the Mharatta court.

Three months having elapsed from the date of the treaty, and no notification received from the Peishwa, either of its arrival, or of any resolution he had come

to in consequence, the military operations continued to be vigorously pushed, and in the middle of January, 1781, the whole of the army assembled at Vifrabuy, a place about twenty miles inland from Bassain, of remarkable sanctity and religious repute amongst the Hindoos, and where there are some hot wells, * deemed of great medicinal efficacy. ✓

A part of the army had been encamped in its neighbourhood ever since the 14th of the preceding month, at which time General Goddard arrived himself with the grenadiers from before Bassain, to the seasonable relief of a detachment of Bombay troops, which had been employed for a considerable period before in the southern parts of the Concan, protecting the country and collecting the grain. The harvest was then over, and the troops on their march towards Bassain had advanced as far as the neighbourhood of Vifrabuy, where, having successfully opposed smaller parties of the enemy, they were at length attacked and surrounded by superior force, and compelled to take post in a very strong and advantageous situation, from which it would have been equally difficult for the enemy to dislodge them, as it was impossible for them to advance. ✓ This force, at the time of which I am now speaking, acted under the separate and particular orders of the Select Committee at Bombay, but was afterwards put under General Goddard's sole command, and continued so the remainder of the campaign. ✓

The Concan is a tract of country extending considerably along the sea coast, and is separated from the Deccan on the eastward by a chain * of high hills, running in

* This chain extends itself all along the Malabar coast, almost as far to the eastward as Anjengo; and the entrance into the

in a direction from north to south, and parallel with the shore, over which, in such places as are most accessible, the several gauts or passes leading into the Mharatta country, which from its great elevation is styled the Balagaut, are situated.

At the time the army marched from Bassein, the force of the Mharattas in the Concan and below the gauts, under Hurry Punt Furķea, consisted of at least twenty thousand horse and foot, with about fifteen guns. These were posted on the road to Bhore Gaut, which is one of the most easy and practicable passes, and where it was expected by the enemy we meant to ascend, being the nearest and most convenient route to Poonah, and having been preferred by the Bombay government on a former occasion.

Notwithstanding their numbers, they were too much intimidated to offer any serious opposition, and excepting a few slight skirmishes, in which we were always superior, the army met with little or no resistance till it reached Campoley, at the entrance of the Bhore Gaut, on the 8th of February. The enemy had previously ascended, and from appearances there was every reason to believe they had come to a determination of resolutely disputing the passage. This belief was confirmed by the spies, who gave intelligence, that about four thousand infantry with guns had taken post

the Mysore country, and the whole of Hyder's dominions on the western side of India, is in like manner rendered difficult and hazardous by steep and narrow passes over them, which must necessarily require any plan of military operations entered into from that quarter to be formed upon a very liberal and therefore expensive scale, not only to answer any real and adequate purpose of public advantage, but to guard against the danger of miscarriage, to which it would be otherwise certainly exposed.

upon

upon the top of it, that the whole Mharatta army was encamped at a little distance, and that Holkar, with about fifteen thousand men from Malwa, and another chief, called Ragonaut Pundit, with about half that number, had lately arrived in their camp.

The General considering that any delay would not only encrease the confidence of the enemy, but give them an opportunity of constructing new works, so as to render the pass every day more difficult and hazardous, resolved upon storming it that very night. The grenadiers were accordingly ordered to be in readiness, under the command of Colonel Parker, and a plan of attack formed, which from its own judiciousness and excellence, the gallantry and good conduct of the officer who executed it, and the disciplined, steady valour of the troops under him, proved successful beyond even the most sanguine expectation. The party entered the foot of the pass at midnight, and by five in the morning had gained entire possession of it, driving the enemy from Condolah, the very summit of the hill, and four miles distant from Campoley, most of the road winding through narrow defiles, and up a very steep and rugged ascent.

Poonah, the Mharatta capital, is not distant from Bhoze Gaut more than forty-five miles. Such were the terrors impressed upon the enemy, in consequence of our near approach, and so strong their belief of our intentions to advance towards it, that they entirely burnt and destroyed Telliagong, a very considerable town about half way, and had actually made every preparation for setting fire to Poonah itself, by filling the houses with straw, and removing the inhabitants and effects to the neighbourhood of Settara.

A knowledge of this circumstance united with many other considerations to prevent our pushing forward to the capital, and to confine the remaining operations of the campaign to a defence of the conquests already made.

In the first place, our whole force did not exceed six thousand men, and the enemy's could not be less than eight times that number; it was therefore impossible to make any division of our force, or even to leave a detachment sufficiently strong to defend the post at Bhoré Gaut if we advanced beyond it. Unassisted by horse, we could entertain but little hope of being able to collect provision or even procure forage in a country totally desolate and ruined, and we must on that account have carried a very ample supply of grain with us, which would of course have greatly encumbered and endangered our march.

In addition to these considerations, when we reflect that no adequate or useful end could possibly be attained by entering the Decan, either towards improving the success of the war, or bringing it to a termination, that we had not the most distant expectation of being joined by any party in the Mharatta state, which alone would have justified our advancing; and that without any determinate object to gratify, or hope of a revolution to excite us, we could only have acquired the empty glory of possessing the Mharatta capital for a few days, and of effecting a retreat from it at the most eminent peril and certain hazard: I say, when these matters come to be fully considered, the impropriety and impolicy of penetrating into the Decan, under such an accumulation of discouraging circumstances, will be clear and obvious to every one.

The

The rapid progress of our arms had hitherto produced no overture or notification on the part of the Peishwa, according to the expectations derived from the contents of the Bengal letter; on the contrary, it appeared that the minister, from the time of receiving the Bengal proposals, had become more remiss and indifferent in his endeavours to accomplish a peace, which from our extreme anxiety and sollicitude, he saw it was in his power to obtain whenever it might suit his own inclination or convenience, upon terms far superiour to his most sanguine expectations.

The near approach of the army seemed, however, to rouse him from this security; and a few days after getting possession of the gauts, a message arrived from one Byroo Pundit, proposing to send an emissary to the camp, to converse upon the subject of negotiation. ✓

This Byroo Pundit possessed a considerable share of the private confidence of the minister, and had entered into a secret correspondence with General Goddard so early as the month of October 1780, to which the latter gave every proper encouragement, in order to avail himself of any means it might offer for accomplishing a peace. Nana Furnese was himself privy to the whole transaction; and this renewal of correspondence, after it had been suspended for above two months, induced the General to form some hopes favourable to peace. He therefore determined to promote it all in his power, and answered Byroo Pundit's letter, by consenting to his proposal of sending an emissary, who accordingly arrived in camp the 12th of February. V

All expectations of success, however, from this circumstance soon vanished; and the man, after affirming that “ although the minister wished to unite with the
“ English against Hyder Ally hereafter, it was his pre-

“ sent determination to adhere to the engagements he had made with that chief, and to make no treaty with the English in which he was not included,” returned to his master, promising to communicate faithfully the friendly intentions of the English, and the particular points given to him in charge by the General; in consequence of which, should the minister approve, a public vakeel from the Sarcar should be immediately deputed to negotiate, or at all events an answer should be returned in eight days. The answer was written by Byroo Pundit, and repeated the minister’s determination, “ to make no treaty with the English in which Hyder Ally was not included as a friend and ally of the Peishwa.”

As Byroo Pundit’s agent had declared in conversation, that the proposals for peace from Bengal had never been received by the minister, the General thought it proper, that he might not have it in his power hereafter to plead ignorance of them, as an excuse for continuing the war, and to obtain a decided knowledge of his present intentions, to send him a copy of the proposals, declaring himself empowered to conclude an alliance with the Mharattas, and ready to accede to one upon the terms offered by the Governor General and Council.

The minister’s answer, as it was clear and pointed with respect to his own intentions, and furnished an additional proof of the sincere and friendly inclinations of the Berar prince, I shall here transcribe. — “ Before this time, Modajee Bostla wrote to the Sarcar as follows: The Governor General and Council of Calcutta have sent a treaty to me, but as it does not meet with my approbation, how can it be approved and conceded to by the Peishwa? — I have therefore returned

“ returned it to Mr. Hastings.” The minister proceeds — “ At present that very treaty which you have
 “ sent me has been perused by your friend from begin-
 “ ning to end, and it is certain that the contents there-
 “ in written are not proper or fit for the approbation
 “ of the Sarcar. If you are sincere and fervent in
 “ your desire of friendship, it is incumbent upon you
 “ to make a treaty that shall include the proposals of
 “ those who are allied to, and connected with the
 “ counsels of the Sarcar.”

Thus ended all attempts to negotiate during this campaign, the particulars of which were faithfully and minutely communicated to the Government of Bengal, as well as to the Select Committee of Bombay, with whose immediate advice and concurrence they had been conducted.

The remaining military operations were restricted entirely to a plan of defence; and excepting some smart, though partial attacks, made by very considerable bodies of the enemy, upon the efforts of provisions coming to the army from Pownwell, in which Colonel George Brown and Major Donald Mackay, of the Madras establishment, who commanded on two separate occasions, acquired great honour and credit, the Mharattas contented themselves with now and then advancing towards the post at Condolah, on the top of the gauts, with an appearance of resolution and vigour, which, however, was sure to fail them whenever any corresponding movements were made on our side, or after discharging a few effectual shot amongst them.

In repeated letters from Sir Eyre Coote, who was at that time preparing for the important contest with Hyder Ally in the Carnatic, the most earnest and pressing recommendations had been used for making a powerful diversion

diversion in favour of his operations, by an attack upon Hyder's dominions from the Malabar coast.

The continuation of the Mharatta war, and the positive refusal of the minister to accede to an alliance, unfortunately rendered such a measure absolutely impracticable. The utmost exertion that could possibly be made on the western side of India, while engaged in a contest with the whole Mharatta empire, was to relieve the Madras troops at Tellicherry * by an equal proportion from Bombay, and to send the former round to the coast of Coromandel.

In order to effect this as early as possible, General Goddard found it necessary to descend the gauts, and to march towards the sea coast. He accordingly concerted his operations with such skill and secrecy, that the whole of the artillery and heavy stores reached the foot of the pafs in safety, and without the smallest interruption from the enemy, who, indeed, remained unapprized of his intentions, and were astonished in the morning of the 18th of April, to find that the post had been deserted during the preceding night.

The country through which the route of the army lay to the sea coast, was of a nature remarkably well calculated to resist any impression from large bodies of horse, being exceedingly full of thick bushes and jungles, broken ground and narrow defiles, where it would be impossible, except in very few places, for cavalry to act together. It was not, however, the less dangerous

* This is a valuable settlement upon the coast of Malabar, dependant upon the presidency of Bombay, which the Madras detachment had garrisoned, after the capture of Mahé from the French, and had defended it against the attacks of the Nairs, tributary to Hyder Ally.

to the march of our troops, who had a perfect contempt for the most impetuous charge of the most numerous army of Mharatta horse, and could only be essentially injured by parties of infantry concealed in hollow ways and behind rocks and bushes, for which the situation of the country proved peculiarly favourable.

This mode of attack was accordingly adopted by the enemy, who descended into the Concan, under Hurry Punt Furkea, Tuckojee Holkar, and Purris Ram Bow, three of their principal chiefs. Their number could not be short of fifty thousand men, of which near ten thousand were infantry, most of them Arabs and Sindys, who, excepting the sepoy's regularly trained up in the European discipline, are by far the bravest and most serviceable troops in Hindostan.

The distance from the foot of the gauts to the sea was about twenty-four miles, and during the whole of the march, which lasted three days, the enemy exerted their utmost efforts to harass and annoy the line, but without producing any other effect than unfortunately killing and wounding some of our people. They suffered very considerably themselves, but were unable to obtain the smallest partial advantage over the English troops, or even to seize upon any part of the great quantity of necessary baggage and stores which attended them: a circumstance that reflects the highest honour upon the military conduct and skilful manœuvres of the commander, and upon the steady valour and galliant perseverance of the whole army.

This severe action of three days continuance, in which Colonel Parker, the second in command, gallantly lost his life, and which has been succeeded by no farther military efforts of any consequence, either on our part or that of the Mharattas, terminated the
opera-

operations of the second campaign, as the enemy shortly after ascending the gauts, evacuated the Concan, and the English army prepared to canton at Callián during the approaching winter.

That I might not interrupt my narrative of the transactions on the Malabar coast, I have not regarded the precise order of time, in communicating what was performed during this campaign on the side of Malawa.

In the beginning of the season, pursuant to the plan before proposed, and which had been most strongly recommended by General Goddard, in order to employ Scindia and Holkar at a distance from the scene of his operations, it had been resolved to augment the force in that quarter; and notwithstanding the preferable claims of Major Popham, from his having already distinguished himself in the command, he was unjustly deprived of it, and the conduct of the operations on their proposed extensive plan committed to another officer, whose merits, however great they might otherwise be, ought not to have been put in competition with Major Popham's superior pretensions on this particular occasion.

Another and more capital error, because attended with injury to the public, was the insufficiency of the exertions themselves, and the inferiority of the force employed, even after the proposed augmentation had taken place, to answer any important purpose of real or adequate benefit; by which means it happened, that Scindia, considering himself as fully equal to oppose its progress, detached Holkar with a considerable body of troops to support the minister; and notwithstanding the decrease of opposition, the detachment itself, after advancing as far as Seronge, which is near one hundred miles north of the Nerbuddah, found
it

it necessary to retreat towards the country of the Ranna of Gohud; in effecting which, Colonel Camac, who commanded, planned, and executed with success a judicious march upon Scindia, surprizing his camp, and taking some guns and elephants, and by that means prosecuted the remainder of his march to the northward with less molestation and difficulty.

I have thus conducted my narrative to the conclusion of the second campaign of the Mharatta war; and here it may be proper to pause, in order to take a survey of the general state of affairs at that period, as an attention to, and knowledge of them, is absolutely necessary to form a proper judgment of the measures afterwards adopted.

In addition to the conquests of the preceding year, Bassin and the country of the Concan, extending along the sea coast from Bombay to Surat, had been acquired for the Company, which completed every view of territorial possession their most sanguine wishes, encouraged by the most signal and glorious successes, could have ever led them to expect, or even hope for. To balance these advantages, Hyder Ally had invaded and overrun the Carnatic, where he seemed to have established himself so firmly, by possessing many of the strong holds, and laying waste the whole of the open country, that any adequate exertion from that quarter to drive him out of it was judged absolutely beyond our strength and impracticable. It became, therefore, the chief and primary object of our political consideration, to attack Hyder's dominions from the coast of Malabar; nor is there any doubt but that this expedient, could it have been vigorously and extensively adopted, must have fully answered every proposed useful end, and have delivered the Carnatic from its dan-

gerous, its fatal invader. In effecting this point, however, the difficulty lay, for it was obvious to the plainest sense and most common understanding, that some accommodation with the Mharatta state was a necessary prelude to any attack on Hyder from Bombay. Accordingly proposals had been transmitted for that purpose to Poonah, through the Rajah of Berar, as has been already seen; and although the enmity naturally subsisting between the Peishwa and Hyder Ally, and the advantage taken by the latter during the late troubles in the Mharatta government, of possessing himself of an immense territory south of the river Krishna, yielding annually near a crore of rupees, might have encouraged a reasonable hope of the minister's eagerly embracing an opportunity to recover such valuable possessions, it was unfortunately found, that a resentment of our conduct, a sense of obligation to Hyder for his seasonable interposition, and a confidence in the important benefits expected from their mutual connection, prevailed over every other consideration, and determined him to prefer his late engagements to an advantageous alliance with the English, even though it came recommended to his acceptance by an immediate restitution of all the conquests we had made since the commencement of the war.

This determination on the part of the minister to persevere in hostilities, rendered any invasion of Hyder's territories from the Malabar coast utterly impossible, and while it pointed out the necessity of previously bringing the Mharatta contest to a determination, suggested a vigorous prosecution of hostilities, as the only effectual and speedy means of doing so.

That these were the sentiments of the Government of Bengal, will appear from the following extract of their

their

their letter to the Select Committee of Bombay, dated May 10, 1781. “ We have repeatedly declared, that
 “ we wish sincerely a peace with the Mharatta state.
 “ It is our fixed object, and we shall deem the accom-
 “ plishment of it on honourable terms a most desirable
 “ event. One mode of obtaining it has been tried;
 “ advances have been made, but these advances have
 “ not been successful. A repetition of them would in
 “ our opinion have no other effect, than to fix an opi-
 “ nion of our weakness in the Mharatta government,
 “ and instead of shortening, prolong the duration of
 “ the war.*

“ We repeat our firm conviction, that nothing but
 “ a vigorous and successful prosecution of it, will pro-
 “ duce an honourable termination to it. Under this im-
 “ pression, our instructions to General Goddard have
 “ been framed and continued; and under the same in-
 “ fluence we express to you our wish, that your aid
 “ may be afforded to General Goddard’s operation.”

Notwithstanding this decided opinion of the Governor General and Council, for a vigorous prosecution of the war against the Mharattas, the most urgent and pointed representations of the necessity of making a powerful diversion on the side of Malabar, were constantly arriving from the coast of Coromandel; and the consequences of neglecting to do so immediately, were displayed in the most lively and alarming colours, without any reference to the actual state of circumstances at Bombay, or to the certain ruin with which

* How sincerely is it to be lamented, that this obvious and self-evident maxim did not always strike the Governor General and Council in the same forcible and convincing manner, as it seems to have done on the present occasion.

that presidency would be menaced from the Mharattas, if the force necessary for its protection and security was detached upon any remote or separate service.

In this exigency, the government of Bombay, in concert with General Goddard, strained every nerve they possibly could without leaving themselves entirely defenceless; and they certainly had merit in the disinterestedness with which they were willing to relinquish the rich prize within their grasp, and to sacrifice every hope of their own future aggrandizement, to their desire of contributing to the immediate relief of the distress of the Carnatic. With this view, they sent the greatest part of the Madras detachment round to the Coromandel coast, immediately after the return of the army from the gouts, although from every argument of a just and rational policy, confirmed by the declared opinion of the Governor General and Council, it was supposed that the succeeding campaign must be entered upon with energy and vigour, in order to extricate the Company's affairs from the misfortunes that generally threatened their destruction; and in the subsequent November, when it was found their own hands were effectually tied up from active operations, as will appear in the sequel, they sent down an additional reinforcement to the garrison of Tellichery, which enabled Major Abingdon, the officer commanding, to make a gallant, sudden, and well-concerted sally from the place, surprize the camp, totally defeat and disperse the army of the Besiegers, and take Sardar Chawn, Hyder Ally's general, prisoner, who died shortly after of his wounds. This success was vigorously pursued by Major Abingdon, and followed by the capture of Callicut; and although these facts happened many months after the period of which I am now treating, I have introduced them

them here, that they may not interrupt the detail of more important transactions.

Before I enter upon the latter, I think it also necessary to mention a circumstance relative to General Goddard, whose appointment * of commander in chief at

* I have been the more particular on this subject, because from the manner in which the command of the Bengal troops was continued to General Goddard by the Court of Directors, he certainly was entitled to retain it during their stay on the Malabar coast; and his accepting the station of commander in chief at Bombay, was in compliance with the wishes of the Company, and in obedience to their orders, nor could it in any shape destroy his unalienable right to the command of the Bengal detachment. In order to prove this, I shall transcribe the orders of the Company, appointing General Goddard, dated April 12, 1780.

Paragraph 21. Having taken into our particular and most serious consideration, the state of the Company's military force at your settlement, we have resolved to appoint an able officer to the command of the troops at Bombay.

Par. 22. And having the highest opinion of the zeal, experience, and military abilities of Colonel Thomas Goddard, we have thought fit to appoint Colonel Goddard commander in chief of the Company's forces at Bombay, and granted him a commission of brigadier-general in our service.

Par. 27. It is our order, that Brigadier-general Goddard have a constant seat as third in our said Council and Select Committee.

Par. 28. And as a farther mark of our approbation of the conduct of Brigadier-general Goddard, we have directed, that the pay and allowances received by him from Bengal, as commander in chief of the detachment sent from that settlement, be continued to him, and paid by our Governor General and Council, so long as those troops shall remain under General Goddard's command on the western side of India. He must receive the pay and

at Bombay had been received there in October, 1780, but from the important services on which he had ever since been employed, and his absence from the presidency, he had not entered upon the immediate and particular discharge of that trust until the month of June, 1781, when he received a letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay on the subject, an extract of which I shall here transcribe. “ The Select
 “ Committee have acquainted us, that soon after the
 “ receipt of the Company’s orders of the 12th of
 “ April; 1780, they have transmitted to you a copy
 “ of such parts as related to yourself; in answer to
 “ which you informed them, that you had forwarded
 “ a copy thereof to the Governor General and Council,
 “ and waited their sentiments thereon. As a considerable
 “ time has since elapsed, and you are now
 “ come to reside here during the monsoon, we request
 “ to know whether it is the intention of the Bengal
 “ government and your own wish to accept of the station
 “ and appointments which the honourable Company have conferred on you.”

His reply, cheerfully agreeing to enter upon the immediate discharge of the duties of the chief command, was conveyed in the following very clear and unambiguous terms. “ I beg leave, in answer to your requisition upon the subject of the orders of the honour-

and allowance of third of our Council and Select Committee at Bombay; but if our Governor General and Council shall recall the Bengal detachment, the pay and allowances received by General Goddard on that account, must be discontinued and cease immediately upon the return of the said detachment, as it will be then no longer under his authority or command; and after that period, General Goddard must receive the pay and allowances of our commander in chief of our troops at Bombay.

“ able Court of Directors of the 12th of April, to
 “ transmit a paragraph of a letter received from the
 “ honourable Governor General and Council, which is
 “ as follows : ‘ We have great pleasure in congrat-
 ‘ lating you on the marks of distinction conferred on
 ‘ you by the honourable the Court of Directors, in
 ‘ their orders of the 12th of April, as honourable in
 ‘ themselves, as they have been deservedly bestowed,
 ‘ in reward and approbation of your services and con-
 ‘ duct.’

“ Although the above answer contains no positive
 “ declaration of the wishes of the honourable Gover-
 “ nor General and Council, yet I consider it as tacitly
 “ implying an approbation of, and sanction to, my ac-
 “ ceptance of the important charge which our ho-
 “ nourable masters have been pleased to honour me
 “ with; and therefore beg leave to acquaint you, that
 “ as it appears to me to coincide with the intention of
 “ the Bengal government, so it is my own wish to ac-
 “ cept of the station and appointments conferred on
 “ me by the honourable Company, and I am ready to
 “ enter upon the discharge of the duties they impose,
 “ whenever this government shall deem my services
 “ requisite.

“ I think it proper in this place to mention, that by
 “ so doing I by no means intend, nor is it at all a ne-
 “ cessary consequence I should, to depart from the line
 “ prescribed for my guidance by the honourable Go-
 “ vernor General and Council, in the general conduct
 “ of the Mharatta war, and that in all matters rela-
 “ tive to it, as well as what regards the Bengal de-
 “ tachment under my command, I must consider my-
 “ self as subject to the exclusive and particular orders

“ of

“ of that presidency, in any manner they may think expedient and necessary for the service.”

I shall now resume my narrative, which is, indeed, drawing to a conclusion ; and it is a painful reflection, that the few facts remaining to be told, will unfortunately discover the same want of decision and vigour in the councils, and of prudence and firmness in the measures of the Bengal government, which have so conspicuously marked the whole of their political transactions with the Mharatta state, without the pleasing detail of conquest and military success that has hitherto diversified and enlivened the subject.

Impressed with the firm conviction of the necessity of terminating the Mharatta war, previous to the possibility of undertaking any important or adequate enterprise against Hyder from the coast of Malabar, and assured from past experience of the determined spirit of the Poonah Durbar, that an object so desirable could only be attained by a vigorous and successful prosecution of hostilities, General Goddard, as early as the month of July, 1781, prepared a plan of operations for the ensuing campaign, and laid it before the Select Committee of Bombay, who concurred in its expediency, and immediately transmitted it to the government of Bengal for their approbation and assistance to carry it into effectual execution.

In the mean time every necessary and leading step was taken on the part of the Bombay government and General Goddard which depended upon, or could be effected by, their own means ; and the latter, notwithstanding the severe and tempestuous weather which renders the navigation on the Malabar coast extremely hazardous, and almost impracticable during the months of June, July, and August, failed for Surat, at which place

place he arrived the 2d of the latter month. He shortly after effected an interview with Futty Sing, and obtained from that chief a body of five thousand horse for the service of the ensuing campaign, which was two thousand more than the number he was bound to furnish by treaty.

This important point being accomplished, and a proper provision and disposition of the force in Guzerat, both for the defence of that province, and for co-operating with the detachment * stationed on the northern confines of Malwa, whose active services and future junction constituted a necessary part of the intended plan, the General returned to Bombay; and after the vigorous exertions he had made, and the sanguine expectations he had been led to form of success, it is easy to conceive how great must have been his mortification and disappointment to find that the only benefit to be hoped for from all his zealous endeavours, was the alarm which it could not fail to excite in the mind of the Mharatta minister, and that he must be compelled to restrict his own future operations to a system of mere defence.

But before I explain the causes of this disappointment, it is proper to take notice of some events which happened in Bengal during the monsoon. On the 11th of June, the Governor General and Council renewed the credentials they had before given to General God-

* After its return to the northward, the command devolved upon Colonel Muir, who in consequence of Colonel Camac's letters from Seronge, had been detached across the Jumna to his assistance, and had advanced as far as the Rana of Gohud's country, before the news of Colonel Camac's successful retreat reached him.

dard, empowering him to conclude a treaty with the Mharatta state, either in case of receiving overtures to that end directly from the Poonah government, or in case of the arrival of Dewaghur Pundit,* Modajee Bolla's Dewan at Poonah, for the purpose of mediating a peace betwixt the English and Mharatta powers.

In the instructions furnished at this time, after declaring the treaty tendered to the Mharatta government in the preceding October, to be the basis of that proposed to be now concluded, they particularly except the cession of the fort and territory of Bassein, which they say, as the minister did not choose to avail himself of their former proffer, and considering the very favourable turn which their affairs have since taken, they are of opinion that they are warranted in reserving, if they can, for the benefit of the Company.

In a subsequent paragraph of the same letter, they recede from the above determination in the following words: " If the minister shall refuse to yield up the

* Here we unfortunately see the unaccountable predilection in favour of Modajee, the Rajah of Berar, and ill-placed confidence in his friendship, operating with an equal degree of force to what it had done upon so many preceding occasions, notwithstanding the lessons we might have learnt from his conduct when General Goddard's detachment arrived on the confines of his country, on its march to Bombay; from his acceding to the general confederacy in the middle of 1779, and afterwards detaching a body of troops, under his son Chimnajee, towards Bengal; from the too successful arts he had practised, to retard and obstruct the early advance of Colonel Camac's detachment to regain Scindia's capital; and from the line of treacherous policy he adopted much about the same time, with respect to the proposals for peace with the Poonah government, transmitted through him in October 1780.

“ pretensions of the Peishwa to Bassain, and to accede
 “ to a treaty either of alliance or peace unless it be re-
 “ stored, we empower you in such case to give it up.
 “ This is a point of which, having expressed our wishes
 “ as far as we can propose them for effect, we must
 “ finally and wholly rely on your discretion, to decide
 “ it in whatever manner you shall judge best for attain-
 “ ing the sole end which we have in view, which is
 “ Peace. In all events, an honourable and equal peace,
 “ and if it can be attained, an advantageous one.”

I have been the more particular in transcribing the
 above paragraph, because it proves, that the Governor
 General and Council, at the time of penning these in-
 structions, had not adopted those desponding and me-
 lancholy sentiments which have since prostrated them
 at the feet of an insulting, though vanquished enemy ;
 and that General Goddard’s opinion, repeatedly urged
 both to the Government of Bengal and to the Select
 Committee of Bombay, “ that no peace could be ob-
 “ tained with the Mharattas but by a vigorous and
 “ successful prosecution of hostilities, and that solici-
 “ tude and anxiety on our part would only tend to en-
 “ crease the confidence of the minister, and the info-
 “ lent extravagance of his demands,” was, at the pe-
 riod I am now speaking of, countenanced by the de-
 clared ideas of the Governor General and Council
 themselves.

Their letters concluded with acquainting General
 Goddard, that it being the Governor General’s inten-
 tion to proceed to Lucknow about the middle of July,
 he would of course take Benares on his way, and prob-
 ably Modajee’s Dewan might lay aside his first design
 of a journey to Poonah, and give the Governor Gene-

ral a meeting at Benares,* in which case, he, the General, was to continue his negotiation with the Mharatta government, but suspend the execution of the treaty, and constantly advise the Governor General of his proceedings, and of every thing material to be known.

Whatever effect might be produced from the intended visit of Modajee's Dewan to Poonah, it seemed to the General pretty certain, that no overture could reasonably be expected directly from the Poonah government, and that they would continue to be directed by the same policy as the preceding year, wisely avoiding any advances themselves, since they had it in their power to conclude a treaty whenever they might find it convenient, upon such conditions as they should judge most for their interest, and consistent with the actual state of circumstances at the time.

It was for this powerful reason, and because no adequate or serious attack could possibly be made upon Hyder's dominions from the coast of Malabar, until some previous settlement either of peace or alliance should take place with the Mharattas, that the Bombay government and General Goddard were desirous of adopting vigorous measures,† and of making one great and formidable exertion of all the force which they could

* It unfortunately happened that Dewaghur Pundit, Modajee's Dewan, fell sick about this time, and died shortly after, so that his intended journey either to Poonah or Benares never took place, and the sincerity of Modajee's friendship luckily escaped the very severe and arduous trial it must otherwise have undergone.

† It appears by a minute of General Goddard's, at the Select Committee of Bombay, early in November, that this opinion of the

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could themselves collect, generally aided by the Governor General and Council, and particularly supported by the operations of their detachment under Colonel Muir, in order to impress the Poonah minister with that belief of our yet unreduced strength, and apprehension of his own future loss and danger, which they were justly sensible could alone produce a disposition favourable to our views of peace, or even procure a timely suspension of hostilities; nor was it till the month of November, 1781, that they found themselves compelled to abandon every idea of acting offensively, and to accommodate themselves as far as the necessary attention to their own safety would permit, to the new system adopted in Bengal, and the measures lately pursued in consequence of it. I have already hinted Mr. Hastings's intention of proceeding to Lucknow. He accordingly left Calcutta, and arrived at Benares the middle of August, in the neighbourhood of which his journey terminated, for he was compelled to retire into the fortress of Chunar, as an asylum from the hostile vengeance and spirited resentment of Rajah Cheyt Sing, a Zemindar, who rented the rich city and

the necessity of preserving an appearance of vigour was strongly supported by the contents of a letter from Mr. Holland, resident at the court of Hydexabad, dated Sept. 2, 1781, where, after acquainting the General that he had a negotiation on foot with the Nizam for an alliance against Hyder Ally, he says, " I don't know what your plan of operations may be; if the cypher reaches you safe, I should be obliged to you for information, as they may very materially concern my movements in the negotiation. If an active campaign be not intended, yet the giving out a report of such intention, and making some movements to favour it, the Nizam thinks will be of use in disposing the Mharattas to listen to terms of accommodation."

depen-

dependencies of Benares under the English Company ; and to this place Affuph ul Dowla, Nawab of Oude, arrived in person to his relief and enlargement ; by which means an opportunity offered of settling the business which carried the Governor General towards Lucknow, without proceeding any farther.*

It was under the impression of the alarm and confusion which the tumult at Benares excited, and I am willing to believe, the disappointments given to his hopes of Dewaghur Pundit's visiting Poonah or Benares, that Mr. Hastings authorized the officer in command of the northern detachment, to conclude a separate treaty with Mahadjee Scindia ; by which it was stipulated, that the English troops should immediately recross the Jumna, and Scindia promised on his part to endeavour to negotiate a treaty of peace betwixt Hyder Ally and the English, and betwixt the Peishwa and the English ; in which should he not succeed, he agreed to remain neuter in our future contests with them.

These were the only articles of any importance to the general interests of the Company, and the termination of the Mharatta war. The rest provided for the security of some of the petty Rajahs who had taken part with us, but in such loose and indefinite terms,

* As the particulars are tedious, and unnecessary to a knowledge of the Mharatta affairs, I have thought it most proper to avoid a detail of Mr. Hastings's transactions with the Rajah of Benares, as well as of the business settled with the Vizier at this meeting. It is sufficient here to observe, that the Governor General's object upon the present occasion was to raise a sum of money, in which he materially succeeded, and that the public necessities had in his opinion fully justified the following maxim upon political, if not moral principles : " Get money, honestly if you can ; but at all events get money."

that

that it was plain we had shamefully sacrificed them to our own political views ; as the free and unmolested enjoyment of their possessions was secured to them only during their own good behaviour, or, in other words, during the pleasure of Mahadjee Scindia.*

A copy of this treaty was received by General Goddard, at Bombay, in November ; and at the same time a letter arrived from the Governor General, explaining his views in making a treaty with Mahadjee Scindia, and his expectations of that chief's mediating a peace betwixt the English and the Mharattas, as well as of a cessation of arms being immediately agreed to for that purpose.

This point, however, Scindia seems to have considered himself as incompetent to settle ; and Colonel Muir, in his letter which accompanied the treaty, only says, that he had promised Scindia to recommend a cessation of hostilities should take place as soon as possible. It is worthy of remark also, that Scindia, in the very article which stipulates an endeavour on his part to negotiate a peace betwixt the English and Mharattas, agrees to attempt the same good office betwixt the English and Hyder ; and his promise to remain neuter if unsuccessful, offers no material advantage to our future
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* The fortrefs of Gualior had been delivered over to the Ranna of Gohud some months previous to the treaty ; and it was expressly stipulated with Scindia, that he should continue to possess it, but under the restriction above mentioned : accordingly, Scindia shortly after, no doubt upon the clearest and most convincing proofs of his guilt, commenced hostilities against him, and desolated his country. A useful lesson, amongst many others, to the princes of Hindostan, how far they repose a confidence in English honour and generosity.

operations in the one case more than in the other; since his personal attendance might easily be dispensed with, and no diminution of the real strength and resources of the Mharatta nation take place; nor could he, as a subject of the Peishwa, detain the revenue or military force of the provinces in his own hands, without exceeding a neutral part, and acting in opposition to the established authority of the Poonah minister, which I am persuaded, and a survey of his whole conduct will prove the assertion, it never has been, nor will it in future be, either his intention or his interest to do.

About the time of this treaty's arrival at Bombay, the Select Committee also received a letter from Fort St. George, under the signature of Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. Macpherson, one of the members of the Supreme Council of Bengal, to which place he was then on his way from Europe, inclosing a copy of one which they had jointly addressed to the Peishwa, with offers of peace, in the name of the Company, the King and Parliament of Great Britain, and promises, that the Governor General and Council would make a treaty upon the conditions wished for by the Peishwa, with which they declared themselves fully acquainted.

This self created dictatorial junto, in their letter to Bombay, use the following very extraordinary expressions: "It is our meaning, that all hostilities do immediately cease on the part of the government of Bombay, in the same manner as hostilities cease on the part of the Mharattas," and conclude by acquainting the committee, that they may expect to receive instructions from Bengal of a similar nature as soon as possible, and that this letter would be forwarded

to

to them through the channel of the Mharattas, to whom they had transmitted it for that purpose.*

In consequence of the earnest solicitude for peace expressed in the Madras letter, and the effectual bar which that circumstance, as well as the recall of the Malwa detachment, occasioned to every hope of terminating the Mharatta war, by a vigorous and successful campaign, General Goddard, in order that he might be immediately enabled to turn the force on the Malabar coast against Hyder Ally, and considering a treaty with the Peishwa as a necessary leading step, proposed to the Select Committee of Bombay, to make overtures to the Poonah minister for commencing a negotiation. This measure they highly approved of, and a letter was accordingly dispatched, generally expressing the friendly disposition and inclinations of the English, and offering to depute a confidential person to the Peishwa's court.

Although the government of Bombay, as well as General Goddard, could not with propriety indulge the hope of effecting an alliance with the Mharattas, upon

* As a proof of the unfavourable effect which these earnest solicitations for peace on our part, and urged in so extraordinary a style, certainly produced in the mind of the minister, it may not be amiss to observe, that the original of the above letter, though received at Poonah, was never forwarded to Bombay; and that when Captain Watherston afterwards expressed his surprise to Nana Furnese at his neglecting to do so, he acknowledged in reply, that it appeared to him a matter of too little consequence to deserve any serious attention. The truth, however, really was, that the eagerness and anxiety we imprudently discovered, had fully convinced the minister of our weakness and distress, and that it would always be in his power to chuse the time, as well as dictate the terms of a treaty with the English.

the conditions which the Bengal instructions to the latter of the 11th of June, 1781, authorised, they justly considered, that some overture on their part was requisite to convince the minister, that they possessed the same pacific intentions with the other presidencies; and they reasonably concluded, that fresh instructions, subsequent to the agreement with Scindia, and to the dispatch of the Fort St. George letter, would have been transmitted to General Goddard, at that time publicly invested with plenipotentiary powers from Bengal at the Mharatta court, and in all probability arrive at Bombay before the confidential agent he proposed to depute could set out for Poonah.

Had this obvious, this direct line of policy been pursued, there is the greatest reason to believe, that even less ample concessions than those which have since been offered through Scindia, and similar arguments personally urged to the minister, would have proved successful, and that the united force of the Peishwa and the English would long ere this have acted offensively against Hyder Ally, or, at least, that by a concerted neutrality on the part of the former, we should ourselves have been at liberty to make a powerful attack upon his dominions from the Malabar coast.

The Mharatta minister having signified his ready and cheerful acquiescence to receive a confidential person, the General deputed Captain Watherston * to Poonah, where he arrived the 14th of January, 1782.

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* The deputation of this gentleman to the Mharatta court was peculiarly acceptable to Nana Furnese the minister, since, though not personally known, a correspondence had commenced betwixt them so early as the year 1779, and through the recommendation

I shall not here enter into a particular description of his negotiation, since it ultimately failed in producing a treaty. This failure, however, must not be attributed either to his want of zealous endeavour, or to disinclination on the part of the minister, but to a new system unfortunately adopted in Bengal, which deprived General Goddard of his plenipotentiary powers at the very instant when they promised to prove effectual, and placed a confidence in the supposed influence and good offices of Scindia, which, even admitting the sincerity of his intentions, they could not in good policy deserve.*

commendation of Dewaghur Pundit, Modajee Bofla's Dewan, he had frequently expressed his strong desire, that an interview should take place.

* The following fact clearly points out the impolitic tendency of the various measures adopted for obtaining peace, and particularly the falacious idea of expecting it through the mediation of any other power, in preference to an immediate application to the minister himself, viz. In order to disprove the arguments advanced by Captain Watherston, to prevail upon the Mharatta court to confide in the effects of Mr. Anderson's negotiation, and to concur seriously and heartily with him in settling the conditions of a treaty, the minister frankly declared that he could not but entertain the strongest doubts and apprehensions on the present occasion; for, says he, " You produced credentials in the name of General Goddard, which the government of Bengal have since transferred to Mr. David Anderson, and," added he, with an expressive smile, " Modajee Bofla now writes me, that an English gentleman has arrived at the court of Naigpore, with full powers from Mr. Hastings to conclude a treaty with the Peishwa. How do I know, but that, when I have finally settled matters with the former, the latter may produce his credentials, and declare the engagements made by Mr. Anderson to have been illegal and unauthorized?"

✓ Captain Watherston met with the most gracious and friendly reception from the minister; and although the latter was exceedingly disappointed, that the expected instructions had not yet arrived from Bengal, and acknowledged that he had authorized Mahadjee Scindia to receive proposals from Mr. Hastings from another channel, he at the same time declared his sincere hopes, that these proposals might be made directly to him through General Goddard; and even afterwards, when in consequence of the General's letter of the 24th of ✓ January from Bombay, communicating Mr. David Anderson's appointment to conclude a treaty with the Peishwa, and the supercession of his own negotiatory powers, Captain Watherston solicited permission to return to Bombay, the minister repeatedly expressed his desire to detain him at Poonah, until the Governor General of Bengal might furnish him with fresh instructions. Indeed, so earnest and pressing was he on this head, that Captain Watherston, notwithstanding the orders he had received to quit the Mharatta court, where his presence could no longer be useful, as he possessed no powers to treat, and the minister might improve it to his own particular views of advantage, ventured to avail himself of the caution given at the same time of regulating his conduct by an attention to the general wish of the Bengal government for peace, and to the particular success of Mr. Anderson's negotiation, and consented to remain at the Mharatta court twenty-five days longer, at the expiration of which period, the minister promised to agree to his departure, should he require it.

✓ This reluctance and unwillingness of the Poonah administration to part with Captain Watherston, visibly proceeded from the disappointment given to the hopes which

which his arrival had excited in the mind of the minister, of himself negotiating and concluding any treaty of peace or alliance with the English, instead of employing and trusting to the agency of another; a measure to which he had already shewn himself particularly averse in the case of Modajee Boffa, and which it was reasonable to believe, he would, from motives of jealousy and suspicion, view in a light still more obnoxious with regard to Scindia, who, though an immediate subject of the Peishwa, and one of the most firm supporters of the minister, was known to be exceedingly ambitious and enterprising, and famed even among the Mharattas themselves for craft and dissimulation.

The measure itself may also be considered as a great political error, and an irremediable misfortune with respect to our own interests; for exclusive of the minister's entertaining the sentiments above mentioned, an immediate communication with himself would certainly have proved most beneficial, by obtaining an early and decided knowledge of his real intentions, and preventing the effects of those artful subterfuges, and that system of procrastination, which he has since found means to practise with such success.

Indeed Mr. Hastings himself was so sensible of the superior political convenience attending this direct intercourse with the minister, that in reply to Captain Watherston's letter of the 15th of January, communicating his arrival and friendly reception at the Mharatta court, although a partiality to the mode of negotiation he had recently adopted, or some other equally powerful consideration, would not suffer him to invest that gentleman with any authority to treat upon particular points, or even to impart to him the nature of the treaty proposed to be concluded through Scindia, " he, however,

“ however, directed him to continue at Poonah, to
 “ employ his most skilful management and address to
 “ prevent any prejudice being had to the views of the
 “ Bengal government, from the stop thus put to his
 “ farther negociation; and finally to make such com-
 “ munications to Mr. Anderson, as his observations of
 “ the temper, object, and other circumstances of the
 “ Poonah government might suggest, and be useful to
 “ the success of the commission with which he was
 “ charged.”

A considerable time before the receipt of these orders from the Governor General, Captain Watherston had left the Mharatta capital, and returned to Bombay, where he arrived, after an absence of two months and a half, the 18th of March, 1782, accompanied by Captain Banks of the Madras establishment, and Mr. Shaw, two gentlemen who had languished since December 1779, under a long and severe captivity at Poonah, and whose release Captain Watherston warmly solicited, and had at length the heartfelt satisfaction to obtain from the minister previous to his departure, without ransom or any condition whatever, and as a declared testimony of personal friendship and esteem.*

How-

* As the whole of Captain Watherston's public correspondence during his residence at Poonah, and particularly his address to the Governor General, dated Jan. 23d, 1782, will have been transmitted to the honourable the Court of Directors, any partial extracts from his letters must be unnecessary. I shall therefore at present finish the subject of his embassy, by transcribing his own words from the concluding letter of his correspondence with Mr. Hastings, dated Poonah, March 9th, 1782, which describes in very just and impartial colours the nature and effects of his negociation. “ In the several letters which I have had

“ the

However mortifying and unjust this supercession of the powers delegated to General Goddard, and at the

“ the honour to address you from this place, every circumstance
 “ has been represented in as minute and clear a manner as I possibly could; and nothing at present occurs to me, as before
 “ omitted, the communication of which is necessary to lay open
 “ the sentiments and designs of this court with the greater certainty and precision, than what my correspondence may have
 “ already effected.

“ If I have failed in accomplishing the important objects of
 “ my deputation, or in rendering such essential service to the
 “ Company’s interests, as might have been expected from my
 “ situation, the former must be attributed to circumstances which
 “ could not be foreseen or avoided, and the latter I may lament
 “ as a misfortune, but cannot help entertaining a hope it will
 “ never be imputed as a fault, being conscious in my own breast
 “ of having been actuated by the most zealous and unprejudiced
 “ wishes for the public good, and of having exerted all my endeavours strenuously and solely to that end; and although the
 “ sanguine expectations formed by General Goddard, when he
 “ deputed me to Poonah, of fulfilling your desire of an alliance
 “ with the Mharatta state, have been disappointed, he has still
 “ the happy consolation to reflect, that my presence with the
 “ minister at this time has been productive of some benefit to the
 “ public cause, and assisted in laying the foundation of future
 “ friendship, by an early discovery of the secret designs of the
 “ Mharatta government, and the policy which influences their
 “ conduct, by rendering the arts of concealment and procrastination on their part less easy to be practised hereafter, by establishing a more free and unreserved communication of sentiment on both sides, and by removing every doubt and suspicion from the mind of the minister, relative to your intentions
 “ in deputing Mr. Anderson, of whose exclusive and superiour
 “ powers to treat, he has at last declared himself to be perfectly
 “ satisfied.”

very instant of his commencing a negotiation, must have reasonably appeared to him, it is evident from his instructions to Captain Watherston, and from the whole of his subsequent conduct, that he did not allow his own private feelings on this occasion to operate to the prejudice of the public interest, or relax in the smallest degree in his zealous and unwearied endeavours to forward the future views of the Bengal government, to whom, in his address of the 16th of February, acknowledging the receipt of the Governor General's letter, which had revoked his plenipotentiary appointment, he expressed himself in the most temperate though spirited terms; and in the language of unbiassed truth and candid sensibility, while he declared his fixed determination of strenuously and invariably exerting himself to promote the successful accomplishment of Mr. Anderson's treaty, he only added a sincere and fervent hope, " that the measures then adopted, and the
 " change which had taken place in the channel of ne-
 " gociation, might not prove in the most distant de-
 " gree of proportion so prejudicial to the Company's
 " interests, as he was compelled to feel and declare
 " them injurious to himself."*

Imme-

* It is worthy of remark, that though the Governor General and Council, in their letter to General Goddard of the 24th of Dec. 1781, use the following words, " The Governor General
 " will explain to you, that the appointment of Mr. Anderson,
 " as minister to Poonah, was a measure of local necessity, and
 " not dictated by any disapprobation of your conduct in the ple-
 " nipotentiary character with which you were invested," Mr. Hastings contented himself with an explanation far less satisfactory than such a liberal declaration on the part of the Bengal government gave reason to expect, and restricted it to a simple
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Immediately after Captain Watherston's return from Poonah, and the consequent cessation of hostilities with the Mharattas, which, though not formally agreed to, had then actually taken place, by a consent mutually implied, though not declared, the government of Bombay, in concert with General Goddard, meditated an attack upon Hyder's dominions from the coast of Malabar; and however averse they were to any inferior attempt, which they were sensible must only produce an augmentation of expence, and be attended with imminent hazard, without any adequate acquisition in prospect, and without any hope of seriously alarming Hyder with fears for the safety of his kingdom, and thereby compelling him to relinquish the Carnatic, they planned an expedition against Magalore, and would certainly have entered upon its execution, had not the lateness of the season, and the very dangerous navigation upon the Malabar coast, rendered such an enterprise utterly impracticable previous to the commencement of the monsoon.

Disappointed in their wishes of making an immediate diversion, they were under the necessity of contenting themselves for the present with passing a resolution to attack Hyder Ally as soon after the breaking up of the rainy season as circumstances would possibly admit, and they entertained the strongest hopes of receiving such effectual support and assistance from the Governor Ge-

and unqualified intimation, " that he had thought proper to invest Mr. Anderson with plenipotentiary authority to conclude a treaty of peace and alliance with the ministers of the Mharatta government at Poonah, and that he would first repair to Mahadjee Scindia, who had offered to be a mediator with the Mharatta administration, in order to concert with him the means most likely to produce a safe and honourable peace."

neral and Council during the intervening period, as might enable them to enter his dominions in force, and with preparations corresponding to the important advantages expected from, and only to be obtained by, a powerful and formidable invasion.

For this purpose a plan of operations was prepared by General Goddard, and delivered into the Select Committee of Bombay the middle of April, 1782, in which he stated the number and quality of the troops it would be absolutely necessary to employ upon a service of such moment and magnitude, the expence in which its effectual execution would finally involve the Company, and the sum of money immediately requisite to set such an enterprize on foot.

His plan, though directed to so grand and extensive an object, was confessedly calculated upon such moderate and limited principles, in the means proposed for its attainment, that nothing but the most pressing and urgent necessity of affairs, together with a merited confidence in the known character, experience, and military abilities of the officer by whom it was to be conducted, could have justified the approbation and concurrence it met with. The Bombay government transmitted a copy of it round to Bengal, describing at the same time their own total want of resources, and the dependance they must necessarily place upon the Governor General and Council's assistance for the means of accomplishing it with effect; nor were they without some grounds of hope, from the very flattering and favourable accounts they were continually receiving of the progress and state of Mr. Anderson's negotiation, that the endeavours of that gentleman to conclude a treaty of peace or alliance with the Mharattas, through the mediation of Mahadjee Scindia, might be attended with

with success, and that they might enter upon a plan of hostilities against Hyder, not only without any apprehension of an attack upon their own settlements from the Mharattas, but even supported by them as a powerful and useful ally.

I have thus conducted my narrative to the commencement of the rainy monsoon of the year 1782; and here I must necessarily bring it to a conclusion, being uninformed of such material occurrences as may have happened in India, subsequent to the following month of October, when the monsoon closed, and the season of action commenced.

At that period the state of the war on the Coromandel coast, as far as the land-operations extended, wore an aspect far from unfavourable, and even encouraged some hopes of a successful termination, if either our naval efforts should fortunately prove equal to drive the French fleet from the Coromandel coast, which there was great reason to expect the superiority occasioned by the junction of Sir Richard Bickerton's squadron, that left Bombay about the middle of September, would certainly enable us to effect; or if any adequate diversion could be made in its favour by a serious and powerful attack upon Hyder's dominions from the side of Malabar.

This latter point, however, seemed to depend entirely upon the two following circumstances, viz. "the result of Mr. Anderson's negotiation with Mahadjee Scindia," and "the resolution of the Governor General and Council subsequent to their receipt of the plan of military operations proposed by General Goddard."

Respecting the former of these, although as early as the 17th of May, 1782, a treaty had been settled and

concluded upon terms, the most humiliating and derogatory on our part that could possibly be exacted by a victorious enemy; and although, besides the restitution of our late conquests, we had consented to relinquish whatever had been ceded to us by the Poorunda treaty, as well as to abandon entirely the interests and cause of Ragonaut Row, the Poonah administration had suffered a period of five months to elapse without finally approving and ratifying the conditions of the treaty; and it appeared most probable, that the minister, sensible of the little danger he had to apprehend, and of the unprepared state to which we had reduced ourselves of acting offensively against the Peishwa, would avail himself of the advantage he derived from the mode of negotiation we had adopted, to protract the final adjustment of matters with us, until he had completely matured his own political schemes, and might find it in every respect convenient and perfectly agreeable to himself, to take a positive and decided part either for or against our interests.*

* I have chose to avoid entering more fully into the subject of this treaty at present for the two following reasons. First, Because the treaty itself until ratified does not in reality exist; and secondly, Because however inconclusive and inadequate to the sacrifices we have offered, such articles as relate to Hyder Ally, may appear in their present state, they may possibly lead to, and form a basis of future engagements of the most important nature, which it was necessary should for some time remain secret, or be the subject of a separate argument. The following circumstance, however, deserves to be particularly noticed in this peace, that Modajee Dossa, Rajah of Berar, in the present treaty is permitted to assume his proper political character and station, and is included together with Nizam Ally Chawn and Hyder Ally Chawn, as a friend and ally of the Mharatta state.

Regarding

Regarding the second circumstance above alluded to, viz. "the resolution of the Bengal government upon considering the plan transmitted from Bombay for their approbation," the advices received from Calcutta were not only the most unfavourable and discouraging, but totally destroyed every hope of equipping an armament of sufficient force to make any serious or useful attack upon Hyder's dominions from the Malabar coast, since the Governor General and Council declared themselves unable to furnish the smallest assistance; and in consequence of this declaration, the Select Committee of Bombay, so late as the beginning of October 1782, were compelled to acknowledge that their utmost exertions during the approaching season of action could not possibly extend beyond the reduction of Mangalore, or some of Hyder's fortresses upon the sea coast; and even to operations of a nature so circumscribed and so inadequate to the important objects which in policy prompted an invasion, and which alone could justify the sacrifices offered to the Mharattas, in order to be in a condition to undertake it, the means possessed by the government of Bombay seemed exceedingly doubtful and disproportioned.

I shall here close my narrative, nor is it, I hope, necessary to recapitulate the several facts contained in it, to prove the justness and propriety of the following ideas, which are at least founded upon an impartial consideration and candid comparison of them.

In the first place, I conceive it will be apparent to all unprejudiced and unbiassed minds, that the Mharatta war in 1778 originated with the governments of Bengal and Bombay, and was a matter of choice, not of political necessity.

Second, That let the circumstances under which it commenced have been ever so favourable, the total want of confidence and unanimity which marked the subsequent counsels and conduct of the two presidencies, must have assuredly defeated every hope, and destroyed even the possibility of success.

Third, That the failure of the negociation for peace in 1779, and the subsequent renewal of hostilities, was altogether unavoidable, and a measure founded upon principles of self preservation and defence.

Fourth, That the success which afterwards attended our military operations, would in all reasonable expectation have shortly terminated the war to our honour and advantage, had not our own misconduct, and the misfortunes of our arms on the coast of Coromandel, unseasonably interposed and prevented.

Fifth, That in order to make any useful or adequate diversion from the side of Malabar, and draw Hyder Ally out of the Carnatic, no partial or inferior operation could have availed, and that therefore it was necessary to enter his dominions in force sufficient to alarm him with fears for their safety, as well as to contend with the formidable opposition which the troops employed on so important a service must in such case expect to encounter.

Sixth, That the means of doing this must entirely depend upon, and could only be supplied by the Governor General and Council of Bengal.

Seventh, That previous to any enterprize, it was absolutely necessary to conclude a treaty with the Mharattas, or at least to agree to a cessation of hostilities.

Eighth, That the most certain and effectual mode of producing a disposition in the Poonah minister, favourable

able to our views of peace, was by a vigorous and successful prosecution of the war; and

Lastly, That, when after the repeated proofs we had experienced of the inefficacy of every solicitation and overture on our part, the Governor General and Council were still determined to adhere to the same humiliating system, and to sacrifice every thing to the attainment of a peace, it would have been more consistent with a wise and prudent policy, and in all probability have succeeded better, especially as Captain Watherston's deputation to Poonah had put matters in so fair and favourable a train, if General Goddard had been authorized to make those proposals directly to the minister himself, which were unfortunately transmitted to him by Mr. David Anderson, through Mahadjee Scindia, and which by the arts of procrastination the Mharatta court has already practised, and the opportunity thereby lost to us of improving the season of action to the greatest advantage, his acceding to hereafter can not possibly render an object of political benefit, or answer the useful purpose originally intended, and must therefore be deemed, on our part, a most unwarrantable, profitless, and destructive sacrifice.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It is essential to ensure that every entry is properly documented and verified. This process helps in identifying any discrepancies or errors early on, allowing for prompt correction and ensuring the integrity of the financial data.

Furthermore, the document highlights the need for transparency and accountability in all financial dealings. By providing clear and concise reports, stakeholders can gain a better understanding of the organization's financial health and performance. This transparency is crucial for building trust and confidence among investors, creditors, and other interested parties.

In addition, the document emphasizes the role of technology in streamlining financial processes. The use of accounting software and digital tools can significantly reduce the risk of human error and improve the efficiency of data collection and analysis. This technological advancement is a key factor in achieving accurate and timely financial reporting.

Finally, the document concludes by stressing the importance of regular audits and reviews. These periodic assessments help to ensure that all financial records are up-to-date and accurate, and they provide an opportunity to identify areas for improvement and optimize financial operations.

juncture, that the author feels a sincere and patriotic pleasure in congratulating the public.

He cannot avoid mingling a considerable share of regret with his satisfaction, when he reflects upon the unlucky causes of delay which intervened to prevent the conclusion of a treaty, until the period of successful fortune above mentioned; a period that justified the most sanguine hopes of an honourable termination to our Indian contests, and must in its progress have infallibly procured for us conditions of peace with the Mharatta state, proportioned in some measure to the conquests we had made from it.

The preceding narrative clearly explains what is meant by the causes of delay above referred to; and a perusal of the treaty itself will best point out to the intelligent reader, the motive of the author's regret for the great and unprofitable sacrifices which have been made to obtain it.

The presidency of Bombay, deprived of every political consequence it had acquired during the late successful struggle with the Mharattas, must now sink into an obscurity, from which it will be almost impossible ever again to emerge; and instead of indulging the flattering prospect of an extended commerce or increased revenue, must be contented to move in a line the most humiliating and circumscribed, possessing no power or resource whatever, receiving no respect or consideration from any of the neighbouring states, and burdening the Company with a heavy and constant expence, without even the most distant hope of relief at any future period, or by any probable turn of fortune whatever.

That this picture is by no means too highly coloured or overcharged, a comparison of the treaty concluded

by Colonel Upton in March 1776 with that now made public, will at once discover.

It is, indeed, but too evident, that had Hyder Ally still lived to insult the Carnatic, the stipulations of the present treaty offer no adequate benefit, or prospect of advantage, proportioned to the important sacrifices made in it : but when we reflect, that by his death the whole scene has been reversed, and a new set of actors introduced upon the stage ; that a change of interests and political connections has consequently taken place ; and also, that the chiefs who reluctantly submitted to the father, are with difficulty restrained within the bounds of obedience to the son,* how sincerely and how seriously is it to be lamented, either that a treaty could not have been concluded with the Mharattas at a time when their alliance might have been of use to retrieve our affairs, or that we did not possess a sufficient share of political wisdom and foresight, to have left ourselves the freedom of deliberation and choice, whenever a fortunate opportunity might present itself of expecting and demanding honourable, if not advantageous terms.

I will even venture to go a step farther, and I am persuaded, the impartial part of mankind will not think I hazard too much in affirming, that the conditions to which we have submitted are of so ruinous and disgraceful a nature, that nothing but some secret agreement, to

* This spirit of rebellion has already manifested itself in the fortunate defection which put us in possession of the Bidenorr country, and promises to produce effects still more important and beneficial, should the projected revolution at Seringapatnam, in favour of the dethroned family of Mysore, be attended with success.

which we are at present strangers, and an equal partition of the whole of Hyder Ally's territories betwixt the English and Mharattas, can possibly justify, or even excuse our acceding to them:

With this remark I shall now dismiss the subject, and defer its farther consideration until recent advices from India shall admit of our properly estimating the loss we at present sustain, and of comparing it with the extent of future benefit, which it may be intended to produce.

That Providence may fortunately continue to interpose, and prevent the misfortunes with which a train of political errors has long threatened to overwhelm the British interests in Hindostan, is surely a wish in which every real lover of his country will warmly and heartily concur; and the author feels himself at the same time inspired with the most lively and confident hope, of seeing the wisdom and power of the legislature soon and effectually exerted to establish a new, liberal; and uniform system of administration in India, to unite the divided and distant presidencies under one sovereign authority and control, and by directing their attentions and endeavours to the same determinate objects of political pursuit, to render our valuable and extensive empire in the east, equally solid, beneficial, and permanent.

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